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Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton, and Roberta Romanot
In the wake of the global financial crisis, attention has often focused on
whether incentives generated by bank executives' compensation programs led
to excessive risk-taking. Post-crisis, compensation reform proposals have taken
broadly three approaches: long-term deferred equity incentive compensation,
mandatory bonus clawbacks upon accounting restatements and financial
losses, and debt-based compensation. In earlier articles we recommended the
following compensation structure for bank executives: incentive compensation
should consist only of restricted stock and restricted stock options - restricted
in the sense that the executive cannot sell the shares or exercise the options for
two to four years after his or her last day in office. We contend that this
incentive compensation package, which we term the Restricted Equity
proposal, will focus bank managers' attention on the long-run and discourage
them from investing in high-risk, value-destroying projects.
Equity based incentive programs such as our proposal may lose
effectiveness in motivating managers to enhance shareholder value as a bank's
equity value approaches zero. As a consequence, some commentators have
called for pay packages linked to bank debt. We contend, however, that the
more appropriate approach is to retain equity-based incentive pay and to
reform bank capital structure to reduce the probability of a tail event, and
hence insolvency. We advance two approaches, not necessarily exclusive, that
coupled with the Restricted Equity proposal, we maintain, would incentivize
bank executives to not take on projects of excessive risk: meaningful higher and
simpler capital requirements and mandatory issuance of contingent convertible
capital-debt that converts to equity under specified adverse states of the
world. Because the optimal capital level is unknown, we further advocate
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facilitating regulatory diversity within the international financial regulatory
regime, to generate information concerning what level and form of capital
works best, which would improve the quality of decision-making and the
resiliency of the globalfinancial system.
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I. Introduction
In the wake of the global financial crisis, attention has often focused on
whether incentives generated by bank executives' compensation programs led
to excessive risk-taking. Post-crisis compensation reform proposals have,
broadly speaking, taken one of three approaches: long-term deferred equity
incentive compensation, mandatory bonus clawbacks upon accounting
restatements or financial losses, and debt-based compensation. Governments
worldwide have, in particular, regulated bank executives' compensation by
requiring deferral of incentive compensation, mandating clawbacks, and in
some instances, even restricting compensation amounts.' In earlier articles we
recommended the following compensation structure for bank executives, with
which these government initiatives are only partially consistent: incentive
compensation should consist only of restricted stock and restricted stock
1. In 2009, the Group of Twenty ("G-20") adopted principles on banks' incentive
compensation emphasizing deferral and clawbacks, FIN. STABILITY FORUM, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND
COMPENSATION PRACTICES (2009), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications
/r_0904b.pdf. These principles were incorporated into the supervisory guidelines of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision and implemented in the United States and European Union ("EU").
The G-20 consists of the finance ministers and central bankers of 19 industrial and emerging market
countries plus the European Union. The Basel Committee was created by the central bankers of the G- 10
nations to coordinate supervisory standards, with membership expanded to the G-20 in 2009. Most
recently, the EU has restricted bankers' incentive compensation to 100% of total fixed pay, with some
exceptions for shareholder-approved packages. For a summary of the legislation, which is known as
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV, see Client Memorandum, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP,







options-restricted in the sense that the executive cannot sell the shares or
exercise the options for two to four years after his or her last day in office.2 We
contend that such an incentive compensation package will focus bank
management's attention on the long-run and discourage investment in high-
risk, value-destroying projects.
Equity-based incentive programs such as our proposal may lose
effectiveness in motivating managers to reduce excessive risk-taking as a
bank's equity value approaches zero. There is a moral hazard or agency cost of
debt in this context arising from shareholders' potential preference to take
extreme risks when close to insolvency: shareholders would gain from a low-
probability, large positive outcome, while limited liability leaves the losses,
should (with greater probability) the gamble fail, on creditors. The moral
hazard problem when equity value approaches zero may well be more severe
for banks, as their creditors have less interest in monitoring against risk-taking
activity because the government not only stands behind retail depositors, but
also often bails out other creditors as well.3 Properly aligning management's
incentives in this context therefore calls for attentiveness to the interaction
among different pieces of the regulatory landscape of financial institutions,
whereas compensation reform is conventionally analyzed in isolation.4
Incentive compensation reform proposals that advocate linking bank
executives' compensation to debt are directed at this moral hazard concern,
although the tendency for broad-based creditor bailouts complicates the
efficacy of such an approach, compared to using debt-based compensation to
address the phenomenon in nonfinancial firms. We contend that equity-based
incentive pay is still decisively preferable to debt-based pay in motivating
managers to maximize bank value. In our judgment, the appropriate approach
to mitigate the insolvency-related moral hazard problem is to combine a
properly structured equity incentive scheme with a capital structure that
contains considerably more equity than currently required, directly or through
2. Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation:
Focusing and Committing to the Long-term, 26 YALE J. REG. 359 (2009); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta
Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Simplicity, Transparency and Committing to the Long-
term, 7 EuR. Co. & FIN. L. REv. 273 (2010) [hereinafter "Bhagat & Romano, Simplicity."]; Sanjai
Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation for the Long-term, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON ExEcuTIvE PAY (Randall S. Thomas & Jennifer G. Hill eds., 2012) [hereinafter
"BHAGAT & ROMANO, LONG-TERM"]. There are subtle differences across the three versions of our
proposal as we had more time to ponder, elaborate and tinker with our proposal, and respond to critiques
and alternative proposals.
3. In the global financial crisis, for example, the U.S. government protected
creditors and even shareholders in the largest financial institutions, such as the insolvent Citigroup, by
bolstering firms with cash infusions for preferred stockholdings, although it did not bail out shareholders
of other large institutions that failed, such as Washington Mutual.
4. For one of the few formal models considering the interaction of different
regulatory tools-capital requirements, supervision, and market discipline-which provides
counterintuitive results, such as supervision and market discipline are complements not supplements and
that under restrictive conditions capital requirements can be reduced if subordinated debt is mandated,
see JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, WHY ARE THERE So MANY BANKING CRISES? 258-74 (2008).
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the use of contingent convertible debt ("CoCos"), debt that converts into equity
under specified adverse states of the world.
The causes of the global financial crisis of 2008 will, no doubt, be
analyzed and debated by economists for generations. Factors that have been
identified as contributing to this crisis range from misguided government
policies to an absence of market discipline of financial institutions, which
further had inadequate or flawed risk-monitoring and incentive systems.5 Such
government policies include monetary policy (low interest rates by the Federal
Reserve) and the promotion of subprime risk-taking by government-sponsored
entities dominating the residential mortgage market so as to increase home
ownership by those who could not otherwise afford it.6 Sources of inadequate
market discipline include private parties' reliance on credit rating agencies.
Internal organizational factors contributing to the crisis include business
strategies dependent on high leverage and short-term financing of long-term
assets, reliance on risk and valuation models with grossly unrealistic
assumptions, and poorly-designed incentive compensation, factors whose flaws
were exacerbated by ineffective prudential regulation and global capital
requirements in the Basel Accords that favored securitized subprime loans over
more conventional assets. These factors, taken as a whole, encouraged what,
with the benefit of hindsight, can be characterized as excessive risk-taking.
Our focus is incentive compensation not because we believe that was the
most important contributing factor to the crisis. We doubt that to be the case.
Rather, it is our focus because incentive compensation is an area in which
legislators and banking regulators worldwide have implemented regulatory
reforms, even as the appropriateness of pay structures is still a matter of
contentious debate. It is also a factor within the control of bank managers and
shareholders, so that the private sector could undertake changes, in a direction
that we consider more beneficial than the regulatory initiatives, without
needing to harness coordinated government action.
Although we believe that the Restricted Equity proposal is superior to the
approach regulators have taken to compensation, and that regulators would do
well to consider replacing what they have done with our approach, our proposal
is directed to boards of directors because we recognize that it is unrealistic to
expect regulators to substitute it for their recently-adopted initiatives, especially
at an international level, given the arduous process of obtaining multinational
consensus. The complementary proposal for increased capital requirements
could also be implemented by financial institutions without regulatory action.
But because deposit insurance and creditor bailouts have resulted in the market
not requiring banks to hold substantially higher capital than current levels, short
5. See, e.g., Charles Calomiris, The Subprime Turmoil: What's Old, What's New,
and What's Next, 15 J. STRUCTURED FIN., Spring 2009, at 6; Douglas Diamond and Raghuram Rajan,
The Credit Crisis: Conjectures About Causes and Remedies, 99 AMER. EcON. REv. 606 (2009);
KENNETH FRENCH ET AL., THE SQUAM LAKE REPORT 28-29, 75-76 (2010).




of the market believing that post-crisis resolution initiatives will be effective at
limiting future bailouts, we think it improbable that the capital reform
component of our proposal would be voluntarily adopted. Although the
Restricted Equity proposal's effectiveness would be further optimized when
combined with an increase in capital requirements, it does not require such a
regulatory change. For it would reduce the probability that a bank will near
insolvency, the zone in which the need for increased capital requirements is
most critical, and in the typical solvent zone of bank operations it will provide
more appropriate risk-taking incentives than debt-oriented compensation
proposals.
The article is organized as follows. The next Part briefly overviews pre-
crisis compensation packages, how they might have led to misaligned
incentives, and evidence of such misalignment. We then review our restricted
stock proposal, which we maintain will mitigate bank managers' excess risk-
taking incentives, and why we think it is preferable to both what governments
have done and debt-based compensation proposals. We present our approach to
bank capitalization reform, which is complementary to the incentive
compensation proposal, in the last section. In addition to advocating that banks
hold higher capital than presently required, we consider an alternative solution
in which banks would issue contingent debt in lieu of higher capital
requirements. In our judgment, combining the Restricted Equity proposal with
capital structure reform is a better mechanism for reducing the probability of
banks taking on excessive risk than existing regulatory compensation initiatives
or fashioning more complicated debt-based compensation plans.
II. Pre-crisis Executive Compensation and Misaligned Incentives
Pre-crisis executive incentive compensation packages did consist of an
equity portion that was deferred, typically with a 2-5 year vesting requirement,
most often granted in relation to meeting annual performance targets.! But
7. Lehman Brothers, for example, in 2005, paid executive officers with both cash
and equity incentive compensation under its "Short Term Executive Compensation Plan," as well as
stock options, with base pay making up a small portion of total compensation. Lehman Bros. Holdings
Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 16 (Feb. 27, 2006). The equity component was in the
form of restricted stock units (RSU) of which 35% vested over 3 years and the remainder over 5 years,
subject to certain forfeiture provisions. Id. at 17. The stock options could be exercised in two years if the
stock price increased by 28%, otherwise they could not be exercised for 4-1/2 years, with an expiration
date of 5 years. In addition to the annual incentive plan, there was also a long-term incentive plan that
awarded performance stock units that converted to transferrable shares vesting on a staggered basis over
three years. Id. That year its CEO received 58% of his total compensation in equity, but of the 42% in
cash compensation, virtually all was a cash bonus that vested automatically, and that bonus, $13.75
million, was roughly equal to the value of his awarded RSUs ($14.9 million). Id. at 19. In 2007, the
CEO received a much larger percentage in equity than cash, with the cash bonus equal to only slightly
more than 10% of his total compensation, and only about 1/10 of awarded RSUs. Lehman Bros.
Holdings Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 26-27 (March 5, 2008). The firm also paid
non-executive employees annual cash and equity bonuses, with the latter ranging from 1-50% of total
compensation, the percentage increasing as total compensation increased. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.,
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many lower-level employees, whose activities could generate disastrous losses
and who were highly paid, such as, individuals trading for the bank's
proprietary account, received straight cash bonuses at year-end, pegged to the
booked profits of their trades (even though the trades were open and initial
profits could, as it turned out in the crisis, generate crushing losses).8 Further,
banks' risk officers were often paid low or flat salaries compared to other
executives and their authority and ability to control risk-taking varied
considerably across institutions.9 These organizational incentives no doubt
worked at cross purposes with senior executives' ability to manage their firms'
risk and performance as the global crisis unfolded.
How might the incentives generated by incentive compensation programs
in banks lead to excessive risk-taking and benefit executives and traders at the
expense of long-term shareholders? Consider a stylized example, an investment
project or trading strategy that in any given year can lead to six cash flow
outcomes with equal probability, five of which are a positive $500 million and
the sixth is a random loss that increases over time (until a certain future period)
denoted by the following time-varying random variable:
Sixth outcome = -$(0.5 + F) billion; for t between years t, and t2 , and
Sixth outcome = -$(0.5 + e)(t) billion; for t greater than t2 years,
where, c is an error term with mean zero and standard deviation c.
Given the above payoffs, the expected cash flow from the investment
project or trading strategy is positive for the first few years. However, after
these initial years the expected cash flow from the investment project or trading
strategy turns negative. Additionally, the life of the project is such that its net
present value ("NPV) is negative.10 The probability, the magnitude of the cash
Definitive Additional Materials (Form DEFA14A, (March 30, 2007) (describing the company's Equity
Award Program because shareholders were asked to approve an amendment to the plan).
8. See, e.g., Simone M. Sepe and Charles K. Whitehead, Risky Business:
Competition, Compensation and Risk-taking, 100 CORNELL L. REV (forthcoming, 2015).
9. Andrew Ellul and Vijay Yerramilli have created a risk management index for
bank holding companies, measuring the strength and independence of the risk management function.
Their index includes both individual and organization features, such as whether the chiefrisk officer was
an executive officer of the holding company or among the five highest compensated employees (true in
only 20% of the firm-year observations, but with increasing frequency, e.g. 43.5% in 2009), and whether
the board risk management committee had an independent director with banking or finance expertise or
met more frequently than average over a year. The index measure varies considerably across firms, as do
the individual components of the index. Firms that had a higher index (better risk management) pre-
crisis had lower tail risk (performed better) during the financial crisis. Andrew Ellul & Vijay Yerramilli,
Stronger Risk Controls, Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies, 68 J. FIN. 1757
(2013).
10. Simplified cash flows and probabilities have been used for illustrative purposes
to clarify the intuition of the analysis. The project's expected cash flows, as in the numerical illustration,
need only have the pattern that early on there are positive expected cash flows and later on they turn
negative, so that the net present value is negative. In this stylized example, the expected cash flows
would be positive for the first four years, zero in year five, and negative for all subsequent years.
Because the six outcomes have equal probability, in years 1 and 2 the cash flows expected by both the
bank executives and the investing public are ($500 million x 5/6) + (-$500 million x 1/6) = $333 million
in each year. For the investing public, $333 million is the expected cash flow in every year because they




flows of the six outcomes, and the life of the project are known only to the
bank executives. Given the information available to or processed by the
investing public, were the project or strategy announced in advance, they would
not perceive that the sixth outcome's loss is increasing over time, and therefore
the stock market would have a different-positive-valuation of the trading
strategy from bank management, as indicated in Table 1.
Table 1. Example 1: Expected Cash Flows (Executives Know True
Probabilities)
Expected Cash Flows
By Bank Executives By Investing Public
Outcome 1: + $500 million + $500 million
Outcome 2: + $500 million + $500 million
Outcome 3: + $500 million + $500 million
Outcome 4: + $500 million + $500 million
Outcome 5: + $500 million + $500 million
- $(0.5 + ) billion
for t between years t1 and t2;
Outcome 6: - $500 million
- $(0.5 + e)(t) billion
for t greater than t2 years
Project NPV Negative Positive
Investment Decision Do Not Invest Invest
How should the individual decision-maker-a bank executive or trader-
respond to the above investment project or trading strategy if he or she were
acting in the interest of the long-term shareholders? As indicated in Table 1,
because the NPV of the investment project/trading strategy is negative, this
investment project or trading strategy should be rejected.
executives are aware that these potential losses increase over time, beginning in year 3. Therefore, for
year 3, the bank executives' expected cash flow is ($500 million x 5/6) + (-$500 million x 3 x 1/6) =
$167 million. For year 4, the bank executives' expected cash flow is ($500 million x 5/6) + (-$500
million x 4 x 1/6) = $83 million. By year 6, the expected cash flow is -$83 million; by year 12, the
expected cash flow is -$583 million. Taking the present value of this series of 12 annual cash flows
using a 10% discount rate yields an expected value of the project of -$152 million based on what the
bank executives know. Because the investing public believes that the expected cash flows are $333
million each year, their expected project value over the same 12 years and with the same 10% discount
rate is $2.27 billion. Under the assumption of a 10% discount rate, the NPV is negative if the cash flows
last for twelve years or longer, which is not an unreasonable time horizon for bank investments.
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But will the individual undertake the investment project or trading
strategy? To answer this question, we have to consider the compensation
structure. For convenience, we will refer to the decision-maker in the example
as the bank CEO. Assume the CEO owns a significant number of bank shares.
Furthermore, these shares are unrestricted, that is, they have either vested or
have no vesting requirements. If the bank adopts the above trading strategy, and
given the belief of the stock market about this investment project or trading
strategy, the bank's share price will increase. In any given year there is a very
high probability (5/6 = 83%) that the trading strategy will generate a very large
positive cash flow of $500 million. If the realization from the trading strategy is
one of the positive cash flow outcomes (and there is an 83% probability of
this), the bank share price will rise, the bank in response will award incentive
compensation to key employees, including the CEO, and the CEO can then
liquidate a significant part of her equity holdings at a profit.'
To be sure, in this stylized example, the bank CEO knows that the
expected cash flow from this trading strategy will be negative in the later years.
There is also some probability (17% in this example) that in any given year the
trading strategy will lead to a negative cash flow outcome. Additionally, the
magnitude of the negative outcome increases over time. What then? In the
textbook corporate finance paradigm, the bank's share price will decline, and,
depending on the bank's equity capitalization, the bank will be insolvent or
close to insolvent, and subject to corrective action or government takeover.12
This insolvency or close-to-insolvency scenario will certainly have a
significantly negative impact on the value of the CEO's bank stockholdings.
However, if during the first few years of this trading strategy the cash flow
outcomes have been positive and the CEO has liquidated a significant amount
of shares, then despite the CEO's experiencing large losses on her remaining
holdings as the bank faces large losses or possibly insolvency in a future year,
the CEO's net payoff from employment in the bank (salary, bonus, plus
proceeds from sale of stock) in the earlier years, may well still be positive and
even possibly substantial. In addition, during the global financial crisis,
governments did not permit the largest banks to fail, and so a rational CEO may
11. In an efficient market, the share price would rise by the expected value of the
trading strategy were it announced in advance, because it is a positive NPV project according to the
publicly available information. Accordingly, the stock price would not rise that much upon the
subsequently realized positive cash flows, affecting the matching of the size of the payout of an
incentive compensation system based on annual stock price increases. For the purpose of simplifying the
example, we ignore that timing issue by making the plausible assumption that the trading strategy is not
public information when adopted and the public valuation (stock price) depends only on the realized
cash flow each year.
12. Commercial banks are not permitted to go bankrupt in the United States:
insolvent banks are taken over by banking regulators, and the assets and depositor liabilities are sold to




have a further impetus to take on the risk: if it is a "too big to fail" bank, even
his equity may be preserved when the bank is bailed out.13
It is not necessary to assume, as does our stylized example, that bank
CEOs intentionally undertook or encouraged employees to undertake, negative
NPV projects or trading strategies, to suggest that pre-crisis compensation
packages could have produced misaligned incentives. An alternative scenario
that could produce a similarly distorted investment outcome would occur if a
CEO misperceives the probabilities of a project's negative cash flows,
rendering a value-destroying project appear to be value creating. If, for
instance, executives have a rosier picture of a project's outcomes than
warranted because, say, they are over-confident in their abilities to manage it,
or they are overly optimistic about the future, then we do not have to posit
managers who intentionally seek to rip off shareholders. We would only be
acknowledging human nature "as we know it," that individuals quite often
believe they are more talented than most and therefore are overly confident and
more optimistic regarding the success of their endeavors than the objective
situation would warrant (in this instance, the executive is overconfident with
regard to project selection or trading ability, or the effectiveness of internal risk
management. and hence overly optimistic about projected cash flows).14 Pre-
crisis compensation packages could again produce misaligned incentives as
they could exacerbate the impact of optimism by not inducing executives to
focus diligently on estimating more accurately all of a project's cash flows or
the risks associated with those cash flows. A similar misalignment could occur
without behavioral assumptions of overconfidence and optimism if the CEO
miscalculates a project's expected outcomes due to inadequate internal
organization information flows or risk management practices, or simply
sloppiness (e.g., lack of effort).
Consider the following emendation of our earlier stylized example, in
which the probabilities of the six possible outcomes are not equal. In addition,
the bank executives do not know the true cash flows and probabilities. Because
the executives' expected probabilities will differ from the actual probabilities,
13. We think that it is unlikely that post-crisis reforms have eliminated "too big to
fail," as ex post it is typically more efficient to bail out an institution than let it fail. See, e.g., ROCHET,
supra note 4, at 31. Even if it were to be more efficient to let the institution fail, government officials
will tend to not want to find out what would happen were they to do so, particularly in the aftermath of
the impact of Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy on the market.
14. The behavioral psychology literature finds that individuals are overly self-
confident and optimistic, often referred to as the "better than average effect." For a corporate finance
application in which optimistic managers perceive negative NPV projects as positive NPV projects (they
overestimate the probability of positive cash flows and thereby underestimate the probability of losses),
which fits with empirical patterns of corporate financing and free cash flow usage, see J.B. Heaton,
Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGT., Summer 2002, at 33. For the classic
review of behavioral finance (the application of the psychological literature to financial decision-
making), see Werner F.M. DeBondt & Richard H. Thaler, Financial Decision-making in Markets and
Firms: A Behavioral Perspective, in 9 FINANCE, HANDBOOK IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE (Robert Jarrow et al. eds., 1996).
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some investment decisions will be made that should not have been made.' 5 As
indicated in Table 2, this occurs in the example because the executives perceive
the project to have a positive NPV, when it actually has a negative NPV. This is
because the managers' calculation perceives the possible loss as more remote,
as well as occurring much further in the future (when they would expect, no
doubt, either that the project would no longer be pursued or they would no
longer be at the firm) than is actually the case.16
Of course, these cash flows and probabilities are hypothetical; the key is
that there can be non-trivial differences between expected and actual future
outcomes. These differences can drive the investment decisions of the bank,
which can become problematic if the incentives of bank executives and the
shareholders are not properly aligned. If, as in the earlier example, the
executives' incentive compensation can be liquidated in the near term, then,
again, they might be able to benefit more on their stock sales than they lose on
their equity holdings when the project's negative value is realized after the
initial successes. The point of this second stylized example is that even if
executives do not seek intentionally to mislead shareholders, but for a variety
of reasons, including overconfidence, optimism, poor internal organization, or
sloppy thinking, they misjudge the outcome, they could be rewarded for doing
so due to short-term incentive compensation. Because their compensation
depends solely on the current (realized) year's cash flow, they will have little
incentive to estimate more diligently the probabilities of the project's
continuing cash flows. A longer-horizon incentive compensation structure
15. As with the original example, simplified cash flows and probabilities have been
used for illustrative purposes. The project's expected cash flows need only be different from the actual
NPV. In this example, this difference is caused by the differences between the expected and actual
probabilities of outcomes. But the difference could be caused by other errors in expectation, such as the
executives not accurately forecasting the cash flows or the extent of the increase of the potential loss in
the sixth outcome over time. In addition, as before, the public is not better informed than the bank
insiders and also perceives the project's NPV as positive; for the purpose of the example, it does not
matter whether or not the reason for the public's miscalculation is that it makes the same estimation
error as the managers.
16. Based on the above stylized cash flow and probability assumptions, the
expected cash flows do not become negative until the tenth year of the project. In years I and 2 the bank
managers expect the cash flows to be ($500 million x 90%) + (-$500 million x 10%) = $400 million
each year. In year 3, when the loss in Outcome 6 increases, the managers' expected cash flows are ($500
million x 90%) + (-$500 million x 3 x 10%) = $300 million. For year 4, the expected cash flows are
$250 million; by year 10 the expected cash flows are -$50 million and by year 30 the expected cash
flows have decreased to -$1,050 million. Taking the present value of these 30 years of cash flows, using
a 10% discount rate, the expected present value becomes -$42 million in the 30d' year. If the project lasts
less than 30 years, it has a positive expected value. However, these expectations are much different from
the actual probabilities. In years 1 and 2, the cash flows associated with the actual probabilities are
($500 million x 75%) + (-$500 million x 25%) = $250 million, considerably lower than the executives'
expected value of $400 million. By year 10, the cash flows associated with the actual probability are
-$875 million and they are -$3,375 million by year 30. Taking the present value of the cash flows over
the 30 year period yields an actual value of -$7.2 billion. The actual value becomes negative much more
quickly than the executives expect: after only seven years, the actual present value is -$275 million,
while the executives expect the present value through seven years to be a positive $1,350 million. The
actual cash flows become negative in the fourth year of the project, and, again assuming a 10% discount
rate, the NPV becomes negative if the cash flows persist for seven years.
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should focus their attention on obtaining more accurate estimates of a project's
expected future cash flows. Moreover, they could no longer benefit at the
shareholders' expense from a project whose short- and long-term cash flows
were so disparate, because not being able to sell their shares or receive cash
bonuses in the early years of the project's life, they will bear the same ultimate
net loss on their holdings as the outside long-term investors.' 7
Table 2. Example 2: Expected Cash Flows (Executives Do Not Know True
Probabilities)
Expected ActualExpected Cash Flows by Bank Executives p bty Probal
Probability Probability
Outcome 1: + $500 million 18% 15%
Outcome 2: + $500 million 18% 15%
Outcome 3: + $500 million 18% 15%
Outcome 4: + $500 million 18% 15%
Outcome 5: + $500 million 18% 15%
- $(0.5 + ) billion for t between
years t, and t2;
Outcome 6: 10% 25%
- $(0.5 + )(t) billion; for t greater
than t2 years
Project NPV Positive Negative
Investment Decision Invest Do Not Invest
Notwithstanding the intuitive logic of the impact of incentives as
conveyed by these stylized examples, the literature on the impact of executive
compensation packages on banks' performance during the crisis is ambiguous.
Riidiger Fahlenbrach and Rend Stulz find no evidence that U.S. banks'
performance in the crisis was correlated with either the CEO's having higher
option pay or receiving larger cash bonuses (i.e., what they consider short-term
17. Bank employees might nonetheless adopt negative NPV (albeit short-term
positive cash-flow) investments in response to pressure from shareholders with short-term investment
horizons. E.g., John R. Graham et al., Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions, 62 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 27 (2006); Eva Liljeblom & Mika Vaihekoski, Who Creates Short-Term Pressure? An
Analysis of Firms with Different Ownership Structures, 59 FINNIsH J. Bus. ECON. 239 (2010). But such
a possibility is only a further reason in support of the Restricted Equity proposal, as it will ensure that
incentive compensation has a countervailing, rather than a magnifying, impact on decisions.
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incentive compensation) or owning more equity, and some evidence that
performance was worse for CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with
shareholders.18 They further report that bank CEOs suffered substantial losses
on their equity holdings and stock sales during the crisis, in support of the view
that bank executives were acting in shareholders' interest regarding pre-crisis
risk-taking.19 Felix Suntheim also finds no relation between any type of
incentive compensation and stock performance, while accounting performance
was adversely affected by short-term incentives but not equity ownership.2 0
However, other studies find that banks whose executives had higher short-
term compensation, or a higher proportion of equity compensation, took on
more risk and performed more poorly during the crisis.21 In addition, the
research of two of us, Bhagat and Bolton, by contrast to that of Fahlenbrach
and Stulz, finds that the pre-crisis level of risk of the largest banks that received
government support under the troubled asset relief program ("TARP") was
18. Rdidiger Fahlenbrach & Rend M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit
Crisis, 99 J. FIN. EcoN. 11 (2011) (assessing the performance of 98 U.S. banks over July 2007-
December 2008, and finding no evidence that banks with higher CEO option pay performed worse and
no evidence that those with higher CEO equity ownership performed better, during the crisis, using both
stock and accounting measures of performance). They measure CEOs' alignment with shareholder
interests by how sensitive the CEO's stock and option portfolio is to changes in the bank's stock value.
The findings were the same for banks that received government assistance under the TARP program and
those that did not. Id. at 22. Esa Jokivuolle and Jussi Keppo use a compensation database that, in
contrast to Fahlenbrach and Stulz's data, permits them to identify the actual duration of compensation
bonuses, allowing fine distinctions regarding how short-term the CEOs' incentives were. Esa Jokivuolle
& Jussi Keppo, Bankers' Compensation: Sprint Swimming in Short Bonus Pools? (Bank of Finland
Research Discussion Paper No. 2-2014, 2014) (analyzing the impact of CEO bonus compensation in
2006 for 86 banks on their stock performance during crisis years 2007-08). They find that CEOs with
shorter term bonuses (which they classify as incentivizing increased risk-taking) do have worse stock
performance during the crisis, and when they restrict the analysis to the 1/3 of banks that paid any
bonuses, the effect is stronger. But the effect becomes insignificant once the model controls for leverage,
among other variables. Id. at 16-17.
19. Fahlenbrach & Stulz, supra note 18, at 23. The CEOs averaged sales of 2% of
their holdings per quarter during 2007-08, except during the quarter of Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy,
when they sold a much larger (approximately 10%) of their holdings. Combining the sales data with
equity and option grants over the period, they state that CEO ownership stayed around the same
throughout.
20. Felix Suntheim, Managerial Compensation in the Financial Service Industry
(Aug. 27, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract-1592163 (examining CEO
compensation at 77 banks in 18 countries, and finding form of compensation, equity incentive, cash
bonus or otherwise, has no impact on equity returns during the 2007-08 financial crisis, but accounting
performance was higher for banks whose CEOs held more equity and lower for banks whose CEOs had
greater incentive pay, either short-term bonuses or option-based compensation).
21. Sudhakar Balachandran, Bruce Kogut & Hitesh Hamal, The Probability of
Default, Excessive Risk, and Executive Compensation: A Study of Financial Services Firms from 1995
to 2008 34 (May, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/astract-1914542 (examining
compensation at 117 U.S. financial firms over 1995-2008 and interpreting finding financial firms whose
executives had a higher proportion of equity compensation had higher risk, measured by the probability
of default, during the crisis as indicating "managers were over-incentivized to take on excessive risk");
Sugato Bhattacharyya & Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Risk-taking by Banks: What Did We Know and
When Did We Know It? (Nov. 18, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract-1619472
(studying sample of US banks, ranging between 233-278 over 2000-06 and finding banks whose CEOs'
compensation had higher sensitivity to short-term earnings experienced higher mortgage default rates in
the crisis, and interpreting findings as consistent with CEOs assuming risk to boost short term earnings).
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much higher than that of banks that did not receive such assistance, and that
executives of those TARP recipients sold much more of their common stock
holdings pre-crisis than executives of the non-TARP recipient banks.22 Because
those bank executives were able to realize a substantial amount on their equity
by sales in the pre-crisis period, compared to the large losses the executives
experienced on their equity stake during the crisis, they suggest that
23
compensation incentives led to excessive risk-taking.
Rather than study executive compensation incentives, Viral Acharya, et
al., investigate bank holding company performance and non-executive
compensation. They find that firms whose non-executives' pre-crisis
compensation was sensitive only to increases in revenue, took higher
(excessive) risk and consequently performed more poorly during the financial
24crisis, than firms whose non-executive employees were not so incentivized.
As they interpret the data, "the more sensitive non-executive compensation
policies to short-term bank performance, the higher the incentives of middle-
level managers to increase the volume of bank activities at the expense of the
quality of the acquired positions," and this risk-taking in the crisis resulted in
significant declines in firm value.25 Their finding is consistent with anecdotal
instances of lower-level employees' trading activities producing staggering
losses, such as J.P. Morgan's "London whale" in 2012 or Barings Bank's Nick
Leeson in the early 1990s. It also tracks the contention in the literature, with
22. Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Financial Crises and Bank Executive Incentive
Compensation, 25 J. Cop. FIN. 313 (2014) (comparing risk-taking-as measured by the bank's Z-score,
a measure of proximity to insolvency, asset write-downs, amount of capital and whether it borrows from
government bailout programs-shareholder returns and CEO stock transactions and compensation of 14
large institutions that received TARP support to those of 37 non-TARP recipient banks over 2000-08,
and finding TARP recipients had greater risk and more sales transactions). The TARP sample includes
some firms that were not recipients, such as Lehman Brothers, as it was by then bankrupt, and some
non-banks, such as AIG, that did receive TARP funds. The CEOs' net trading gains were greater than
the value of their stock losses at half of the 14 TARP firms. Id. at 324.
23. This conclusion is therefore distinctly different from that of Fahlenbach &
Stulz, supra note 18. In Fahlenbach and Stulz's view, bank CEOs and senior executives could not or did
not foresee the extreme risk of some of the bank's investment and trading strategies and the poor
performance of these banks during the crisis is attributable to an extreme negative realization of the high
risk nature of their investment and trading strategy. Their perspective can be analogized to the bank
executives' expected probabilities of cash flows in our second stylized example, summarized in Table 2,
being equal to the actual probabilities. But even if Fahlenbach and Stulz's characterization of events-
by disregarding pre-crisis stock transactions-is accurate, a proposition that we do not concede, it does
not follow that the pre-crisis compensation structure was optimal and cannot be improved upon to
reduce the probability of accepting investments that have large negative tail events.
24. Viral Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives and Bank Risk-Taking (Jan.
2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/13/13-18.pdf (finding, from a
sample of 77 banks, that (i) in pre-crisis years 2003-06 non-executive compensation incentives were
more sensitive to revenues than quality or sustainability of earnings; (ii) the more sensitive non-
executive compensation policies are to short-term bank performance (proxied by how firms readjust
total cash and stock compensation with variations in performance), the higher the risk taken by banks on
a variety of measures-aggregate risk, tail risk, implied volatility of stock returns and Z-score-Auring
the crisis years of 2007-09; and (iii) incentive-induced excessive risk-taking was associated with
significant declines in firm value during the crisis).
25. Id. at 4.
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which we concur, as our earlier compensation reform proposals noted, that
focusing solely on executive compensation incentives is not sufficient to
control excessive risk-taking. 26
III. Mitigating Excessive Risk-taking by Bank Employees
This section introduces our proposal regarding how we would refashion
bank incentive compensation to reduce the possibility that executives and other
employees will undertake excessively risky and value-destroying trading or
operating strategies. We then compare our proposal to the approach taken by
legislatures and bank regulators and to the class of proposals advocating debt-
based, rather than equity-based, compensation.
A. The Restricted Equity Proposal
In a series of articles, two of us advanced a proposal for reforming bank
incentive compensation. 27 We proposed that the incentive compensation of
executives and individuals whose decisions may substantially impact the bank,
such as proprietary traders or sellers of structured products, should consist only
of restricted equity (restricted stock and restricted stock options)-restricted in
the sense that the individual cannot sell the shares or exercise the options for
two to four years after their last day in office. We refer to this as the Restricted
Equity proposal. Many current compensation contracts require the forfeiture of
restricted shares when an executive leaves the firm. Quite to the contrary, we
are not suggesting that restricted shares (under our Restricted Equity proposal)
be forfeited when the executive departs. In fact, we are advocating that
restricted shares not be forfeited when the executive leaves the firm, but should
be retained and the value received several years thereafter.
If the CEO in the stylized examples in section II had been offered
incentive compensation contracts consistent with the Restricted Equity
proposal, then she would have had more high-powered incentives not to invest
in the high-risk, negative NPV trading strategy. Namely, the CEO's equity
holdings would now consist only of restricted stock and restricted stock
options. Not only would the CEO be required to hold these shares and options
for the duration of her employment in the bank, but for two to four years
subsequent to her retirement or resignation. If the trading strategy resulted in a
positive cash flow in a certain year prior to their retirement or resignation, the
bank's share price would go up, the CEO's net worth would go up on paper,
but the CEO would not be able to liquidate her stockholdings. The CEO would
26. Sepe & Whitehead, supra note 8; BHAGAT & ROMANO, LONG-TERM, supra
note 2, at 145 ("our proposal applies to all executives and any individual whose decisions may
substantially impact a firm (such as proprietary traders or structured product sales personnel...").
27. See supra note 2. We use the term "bank" as shorthand to refer both to banks




have to make an assessment of the likelihood of the large negative cash flow
outcome during the years she continued to be employed at the bank, plus two to
four additional years. After making such an assessment, a CEO would
presumably be less likely to authorize or encourage the high-risk but negative
net present value trading strategy in the first place. The long-term feature of the
Restricted Equity proposal's compensation package would operate similarly in
the behaviorally optimistic, as well as the inadequate internal information
structure, scenario: it could curb optimistic estimates of a project's NPV by
using high-powered financial incentives to prod the executive to attend to, and
hence estimate more assiduously, all of a project's cash flows, rather than
solely those in the near term, as well as incentivize the executive to improve
internal information flows. If a bank does not engage in the negative NPV
investment project or trading strategy, then this would, of course, also serve the
interests of the long-term shareholders.
The Restricted Equity proposal is consistent with several recent
theoretical papers which suggest that a significant component of incentive
compensation should consist of stock and stock options with long vesting
periods.28 We note that we have suggested that the time frame extend two to
four years after retirement, but we would leave the specific horizon to the board
compensation committee, to whom the proposal is addressed. 29 The rationale
for this extended time frame is to maintain incentives for an executive in an
"end-game" situation, i.e., an individual making decisions when he or she is
reaching retirement. At the shorter end of our proposal, management's
discretionary authority to manage earnings under current U.S. accounting
conventions usually unravels within a one-to-two year period, although the
actual period depends on the industry and the type of earnings management.3 0
28. E.g., Alex Edmans et al. Dynamic CEO Compensation, 67 J. FIN. 1603 (2012);
Lin Peng & Ailsa R6ell, Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation (Apr. 20, 2013).
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract-=1321903; see also Patrick Bolton et al., Executive
Compensation and Short-Termist Behavior in Speculative Markets, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 577, 580
(2006) ("[I]f the goal is to ensure the maximization of long-run fundamental value, then one may want
to... lengthen stock-option vesting periods... and more generally take steps ensuring that controlling
shareholders (or the board of directors) have a longer-term outlook."). While calling for longer horizons
than pre-crisis plans, the optimal compensation package derived in the Edmans et al. and Peng & Roell
models is far more intricate than our proposal. However, as discussed at pages 121-22 infra, we believe
that simplicity is a key feature of an effective compensation plan, even though it may come at the
expense of simplifying what these models suggest would be a more optimal approach. The Restricted
Equity proposal is also consistent with the model of Jokivuolle and Keppo in which shorter term bonus
compensation structures increase risk-taking. Jokivuolle and Keppo, supra note 18.
29. See infra p. 122. We would also leave to the board whether the number of
shares or options to be received under the plan should depend on a performance target, although we are
wary of the efficacy of performance targets because managers focused on meeting a target may make
decisions that negatively impact long-term value, such as decreasing margins to attain a sales target.
While such an effect would be mitigated by the long-term horizon of restricted stock, if the number of
performance-based shares is set too high, the immediate goal of receiving shares might offset attention
to the long-term value effect of a decision.
30. For CFO beliefs about earnings management see, Ilia D. Dichev et al., Earnings
Quality: Evidence from the Field (Oct. 30, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstr
act-2347428.
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At the longer end, we think four years is a reasonable period in which at least
the intermediate-term results of executives' decisions will be realized.
There is a finance literature suggesting that the appropriate vesting period
for incentive compensation matches the life of the investments to be
undertaken,31 with longer contract periods "particularly valuable to firms with .
. . considerable information asymmetry regarding the long-term effects of
current managerial actions." 32 Financial institutions are just such firms: the
quality of their assets is opaque to outside investors and much bank lending is
of quite long duration, even when securitized (due to banks' retention of the
securities, provision of guarantees to investors purchasing such securities and
their taking back onto their balance sheets securitized mortgages whose value
had declined), as evidenced in the financial crisis.3 3 This makes the post-
retirement duration of the Restricted Equity proposal consistent, in our
judgment, with that literature. 34
How long would the Restricted Equity vesting period last in practice, on
average, for a specific individual? Studies reort a range for the median tenure
of bank CEOs between five and eight years. Hence, on average, a CEO could
expect to wait eight and one-half to ten and one-half years before being allowed
to sell shares or exercise options. In the non-public corporation setting, it is
31. Several articles posit that compensation contract terms should match investment
horizons and then find positive correlations between the length of firms' compensation plans and their
having long-term investment projects. E.g., Stacey R. Kole, The Complexity of Compensation Contracts,
43 J. FiN. EcON. 79, 94, 97 (1997), (finding that firms with more intensive R&D and innovative activity
more likely to use restricted stock and stock option plans, consistent with long-term contracting being
used by firms with long-term projects, and many of those firms required the restricted shares to be held
until retirement); Brian D. Cadman et al., Stock Option Grant Vesting Terms: Economic and Financial
Reporting Determinants, 18 REV. ACCNT. STUD. 1159 (2013) (finding that option grant vesting
schedules longer in growth firms, where lengthening the CEO's investment horizon is "more
important").
32. Cadman et al., supra note 31, at 1161.
33. E.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., Securitization without Risk Transfer, 107 J. FIN.
ECON. 515 (2013) (stating that commercial banks using asset-backed commercial paper conduits insured
the securitized assets, with losses from conduits remaining with the banks rather than the outside
investors); Juliusz Jablecki and Mateusz Machaj, A Regulated Meltdown: The Basel Rules and Banks'
Leverage, in WHAT CAUSED THE FiNANcIAL CRISIS? 200, 213-14, 223-24 (Jeffrey Friedman ed., 2011)
(similarly describing how banks retained securitized assets in structured investment vehicles and
provided guarantees to investors in the vehicles or had to take the vehicles back onto their balance sheets
during the crisis).
34. But the optimal vesting period should match the life of the investment under the
following assumptions: (i) the life of the investment is observable and verifiable; and (ii) the board is
only concerned about aligning the incentives of the CEO for that one investment project. In most
situations involving CEOs of large banks (or CEOs of any large firm) these assumptions are unlikely to
be valid. Moreover, a plan that sought to combine in some fashion the optimal vesting period for a large
institution's numerous investment projects of varying durations would be neither simple nor transparent,
which would be contrary to the simplicity and transparency criteria of our compensation reform
proposal. See infra pp. 121-22.
35. Robert DeYoung, Emma Y. Peng & Meng Yan, Executive Compensation and
Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks, 48 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 165, 178 (2013)
(finding a median tenure of eight years from a sample of 145 CEOs of 114 large banks over 1995-2006);
Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 22 (finding that the median tenure of CEOs of large banks (TARP
recipients) is five or seven years, depending on the time frame).
538
Getting Incentives Right
quite common for top executives to wait for seven to ten years before receiving
a substantial portion of their compensation for work performed earlier. For
instance, the general partners of private equity partnerships typically receive
their compensation in two parts, the more substantial of which, carried interest
(usually, 20% of the lifetime profits generated by the partnership) are realized
towards the end of the life of the partnerships, usually seven to ten years. 3 6 The
widespread use of such a deferred compensation structure in a real world
setting where principal-agent problems are thought to be better-managed
suggests that our proposal could substantially improve bank managers'
incentives, despite well-known differences between the private equity and
public company operating environments. A further benefit of the proposal's
vesting period is that because a CEO would be exposed to the impact of
decisions made by his or her successor, the executive will focus more
attentively on succession planning.
In advancing our proposal previously, we noted several important caveats
that we reiterate here. First, if executives are required to hold restricted shares
and options, then they would most likely be under-diversified. Second,
requiring executives to hold restricted shares and options into retirement raises
liquidity concerns. Third, the proposal could lead to early management
departures, as executives seek to cash out their accrued restricted shares and
options (as soon, of course, as they can, given the two to four year post-
departure waiting period).
The deliberate under-diversification brought about by being subject to a
Restricted Equity plan - more of an individual's wealth will be tied to the firm,
as she cannot liquidate accumulated incentive equity payments beyond annual
earnings - would lower the risk-adjusted expected return for the executive. One
means of bringing an executive's risk-adjusted expected return back up to the
previous level would be to increase the expected return by granting additional
restricted shares and options to the executive. We would therefore expect that
the amount of equity awarded under the Restricted Equity proposal will be
higher than that awarded under a short-term incentive plan.
Executives might be expected to seek to reduce the under-diversification
effect by entering into swap contracts that transform their restricted positions
into liquid investments. To ensure that the incentive effects of restricted stock
and options are not undone by self-help efforts at diversification, executives
participating in such compensation plans should be prohibited from engaging in
36. ANDREW METRICK & AYAKO YASUDA, VENTURE CAPITAL AND THE FINANCE
OF INNOVATION 32-33 (2nd ed. 2011). See also Kate Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership
Agreements: Understanding Compensation Arrangements 1 (Univ. of Tex. Law & Econ. Research
Paper No. 29, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=555626 (arguing that venture
capital partners' compensation contains three, rather than two, components, with the third being the
value of interest-free loans partners receive from limited partners specified by distribution rules
determining when partners receive their share of profits).
37. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversifled Executives,
33 J. ACCOUNTING AND ECON. 3 (2002).
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transactions, such as equity swaps, or borrowing arrangements, that hedge the
firm-specific risk from their having to hold restricted stock and options (where
not already restricted by law).
Of course, derivative transactions based on other securities, such as a
financial industry stock index, could be used to undo the executives' interest in
the restricted shares, subjecting the executive to the lower level of basis risk
(i.e., the risk that co-movements in the firm's stock and the security or
securities underlying the hedge are not perfect). To address this possibility,
approval of the compensation committee or board of directors should be
required for other (non-firm-specific) derivative transactions, such as a put
option on a broader basket of securities. In addition, to ensure that under-
diversification does not result in managers taking on too low a level of risk
compared to the risk preferences of shareholders (behavior that may be of
particular concern as an aging executive nears retirement and may wish to
protect the value of accrued shares), the incentive plan can be fine-tuned to
provide a higher proportion in restricted options than restricted shares to
increase the individual's incentive to take risk.
The concerns regarding lack of liquidity and early departure are also valid.
To address these concerns, we recommended that managers be allowed to
liquidate annually a modest fraction of their awarded incentive restricted shares
and options of between 10-15%.39 The requirement that they must retain the
great bulk of the shares several years until after retirement or departure will
provide a sufficient incentive to advance shareholder long-term interests. We
further proposed that the annual corporate tax deduction for non-incentive-
based compensation for individuals whose incentive compensation consists
solely of a Restricted Equity plan be raised to $2 million. 40 Permitting 10-15%
of each year's incentive compensation to vest and be sold, along with
potentially receiving a higher cash base, will mitigate liquidity and early
departure concerns, particularly for lower-level managers whose bonuses
would not be as large as, and whose employment horizons would be longer
than, those of CEOs. But we are also skeptical that the Restricted Equity plan
will induce an onslaught of early departures by younger executives seeking to
lock-in stock gains: executives who develop a reputation for early departures
from firms are likely to impact negatively their future career opportunities.
We are further sensitive to potential tax liabilities that the Restricted
Equity proposal might generate for an executive. To the extent an individual
38. There are constraints on executives' ability to hedge stock and option positions
under tax and securities laws. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal
Foundation ofIncentive Compatibility, 100 CoLUM. L. REv. 440,445 (2000).
39. BHAGAT & RoMANo, LONG-TERM, supra note 2, at 148. The allowance of
some short-term cash payouts is consistent with the form of the optimal compensation package derived
in the papers cited in note 28, supra.
40. BHAGAT & RoMANo, LONG-TERM, supra note 2, at 368. The Internal Revenue




incurs tax liability from receiving restricted shares and options that is greater
than the amount permitted to be liquidated in the current year, then under our
proposal that individual would be allowed to sell enough additional shares
(and/or exercise enough additional options) to pay the additional taxes.
Figure 1 provides an empirical perspective on the recommendation
41concerning the appropriate percentage of annual liquidations. It shows the
percentage of firm-years, over the interval 2000-08, in which bank CEOs sold
more than 5%, 10% or 15% of their stock holdings at the beginning of the time
period. TARP recipient CEOs sold more than 5% of beginning holdings in 41%
of the firm-years, compared to 16% of firm-years for the CEOs of non-TARP
recipients. They also sold more than 15% of beginning holdings in 17% of the
firm-years, compared to 6% of firm-years for the non-TARP recipient firm
CEOs.
Given those data, the more limited equity shares that we would permit to
be annually liquidated may seem low compared to the amounts that bank
executives have been able to realize in the past (i.e., pre-crisis years). However,
that is not necessarily the case when a longer time frame is considered. The
proposal only limits the annual cash payoffs the executives can realize. The
NPV of all salary and stock compensation can be higher than they have
received historically, as the amount of restricted stock is unlimited. Of course,
the higher value would only be realized were they to invest in projects that lead
to value creation that persists in the long-term. In addition, concern over the
proposal's impact on liquidity needs or early departures, when contrasting it to
the Bolton and Bhagat past sales data, can stand a bit of perspective. Consider
as a reference point the fact that the adjusted gross income (AGI) of the top
420.1% in 2004 had a threshold of $1.4 million, while in 2011 the AGI cutoff
for the top 0.1% was $1.7 million.43 Accordingly, permitting executives a cash
salary of $2 million, and the ability to liquidate 10-15% of annual incentive
compensation, is far from financially punitive.
41. See Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 22 at 58-60 (providing the data from which
Figure 1 is derived).
42. Steven N. Kaplan & Joshua Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What
Contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes?, 23 REv. FIN. STUD. 1004, 1015 (2010).
43. Steven N. Kaplan & Joshua Rauh, It's the Market: The Broad-Based Rise in the
Return to Top Talent, 27 J. EcoN. PERSP., Summer 2013 at 35, 37 .The proposal's restricted availability
of compensation might well lead talented traders and bank executives to migrate to hedge funds, whose
compensation is not subject to regulation, nor is our proposal addressed to such entities. While a talent
drain is most certainly of concern in terms of the important role banks play in the economy, this would
otherwise not create a fiscal problem of note, unless hedge funds were to expand dramatically beyond
their current size and scope, such as becoming a critical part of the payment system. In the recent
financial crisis, for example, a number of hedge funds failed, including some quite large ones, but it was
thought that none needed to be, nor were any, bailed out. Moreover, hedge funds' compensation
structure is thought to be better aligned with value maximization than that of bank employees' pre-crisis
compensation because hedge fund managers earn a performance fee only on increases in a fund's net
asset value above the highest net asset value the fund has achieved in the past. See, e.g., SEBASTLAN
MALLABY, MORE MONEY THAN GOD: HEDGE FUNDS AND THE MAKING OF A NEw ELITE 12 (2010).
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The Restricted Equity proposal will, no doubt, encourage managers to
seek a considerably higher proportion of fixed cash salaries to compensate for
the restricted ability to realize the value of equity incentive awards. But we
posit that the higher deductible cash base, along with the modest amount of
realizable equity gains, should mitigate both such efforts by management and
decrease the probability that the members of compensation committees will
perceive a need to succumb to such efforts. Indeed, there is evidence that bank
directors are not potted plants when it comes to executive compensation, as
they adjust executives' incentive compensation in response to the level of prior
risk-taking.
A final caveat is that the variety of compensation practices across firms
might suggest that standardized pay packages, such as we are proposing, may
be inefficient, because, for example, compensation may substitute or
complement other governance mechanisms, which vary across firms. 45 This is
indeed a matter of concern. But the need for greater variety or customization in
structuring incentive compensation is more pronounced across industries,
where differences in assets and risk call for different governance, and
correspondingly different incentive structures, than within an industry, and our
proposal is focused on the banking sector.46 The Restricted Equity proposal is
addressed to the banking sector because of the externality to the public fisc and
the real economy when banks take on excessive risk, in contrast to other firms.
Of course, there are sharp, self-evident differences within the sector, e.g.
between large complex banking organizations and small community banks. But
excessive risk-taking can be a problem across the spectrum of financial
institutions: although the global financial crisis was concentrated in the largest
financial institutions, the cost to the fisc was quite large when many small
banks failed during the S&L crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s. We
therefore think the proposal is suitable for all financial institutions. And it does
permit some tailoring at the edges: the amount and timing for liquidating
annual incentive awards (within the 10-15% suggested range), the number of
years post-retirement before the employee can liquidate the balance, and the
mix of restricted equity and options, for example.4 7
44. DeYoung et al., supra note 35. The feedback loop was not present at a small
subset of the very largest institutions (those with strong growth opportunities accompanied by very
aggressive risk-taking).
45. See, e.g., David Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of
Executive Pay, 51 BOSTON COLL. L. REv. 435, 447 (2010) (critiquing standardized compensation
proposals due to concern over the heterogeneity of underlying incentive structures).
46. See Stuart L. Gillan et al., Tradeoffs in Corporate Governance: Evidence from
Board Structures and Charter Provisions (April 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/starks_paper.pdf (indicating that governance mechanisms
vary with firm characteristics that are related to assets and investment strategies).
47. To the extent that a board sought to motivate managers to undertake a specified
short-term project, this could be accommodated in the Restricted Equity proposal by the performance
targets used to determine the number of restricted shares or options the employee receives; although the




Most important, our proposal has the advantage of relative simplicity,
compared to the complicated variety in existing packages with multiple
incentive components. A simple incentive compensation structure is desirable
for at least two reasons. First, the financial sector is particularly fast-moving,
rendering it difficult to predict what risks may emerge as products and markets
develop, and how individuals respond to regulatory and contractual incentives
can alter risk in unanticipated ways that can evolve nonlinearly.48 Moreover, in
today's context of large and interconnected financial institutions and complex
financial instruments, banks must grapple with unknown and unknowable, and
not simply known, risks.49 As a consequence, the more complicated and opaque
an incentive package, the more difficult it will be to determine how individuals
will respond, and what risks will or will not be incurred. The relative simplicity
of the Restricted Equity proposal minimizes such difficulties, by collapsing the
incentives to one: long-term stock value. Second, as shareholders are now
required to vote on CEO compensation packages, a simple incentive structure is
easier for them to understand and evaluate, reducing the need to rely on third-
party vendors of proxy voting advice, the value of which service has been the
subject of considerable controversy.50
Given the amount of government regulation already directed at banks'
incentive compensation plans, which, as discussed in the next section, may well
have perverse effects, we are directing our proposal at bank compensation
for achieving the short-term goal by the restricted unit allotment. Of course, our proposal seeks to
address problems arising from a bank's compensation system's rewarding a project's short term return,
and given the nature of bank assets, which are often long-lived investments, we would expect boards to
need to have recourse to such measures infrequently. Similarly, the proposal could accommodate
concern that division executives' and lower level employees' limited responsibilities and efforts are
uncorrelated with stock performance by allocating restricted shares or options in relation to their units'
accounting performance compared to specified targets or the accounting performance of competitors or
the rest of the company. But we prefer stock performance measures, given the easier manipulability of
accounting data. Moreover, the compensation literature contends that the appropriate performance
measure-stock or accounting performance-relates to the relative reliability of the measure, e.g., Kole,
supra note 31, at 82, and the opacity of banks' assets and off-balance sheet transactions suggests that
stock prices would be more reliable than accounting measures in this context.
48. See Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Report No. 3: Financial Protection of Critical
Infrastructure, INSTITUT VEOLIA ENVIRONNEMENT, http://www.institut.veolia.org/en/our-activities
/archives/other-studies-published/report-n3-financial-protection.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2014)
(examining the impact on financial markets of dynamic uncertainty arising from terrorism). The concept
of dynamic uncertainty was developed in the literature on terrorism to differentiate terrorist risk from
natural disasters; the materialization of risk in both instances is highly uncertain, but terrorists adapt
their behavior in response to targets' protective actions, and thus affect risk over time. Id.
49. FRANCIS X. DIEBOLD et al., Introduction to THE KNOWN, THE UNKNOWN AND
THE UNKNOWABLE IN FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT 3 (Francis X. Diebold et al., eds. 2010).
50. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 951 (2010) (hereinafter "Dodd-Frank") (extending to all U.S. firms a
requirement Congress had previously imposed only on banks receiving TARP funds, that shareholders
vote, in an advisory capacity, on CEO compensation). Some countries, such as the United Kingdom and
Australia, already had say-on-pay requirements in place, while others, such as Germany, have adopted
them since Dodd-Frank's passage. For an overview of the debate over the value added by proxy
advisory services see, Paul Rose, On the Role and Regulation of Proxy Advisors, 109 MICH. L. REv.
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 62 (2011).
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committees, who, we urge, should voluntarily adopt a Restricted Equity plan as
the preferred mechanism for aligning management's incentives so as to
mitigate the taking of excessive risk.5 But we are of the view that it would be
equally desirable for regulators to replace their existing compensation
regulation with the Restricted Equity proposal.
We further are of the view that compensation committees should consider
adopting the Restricted Equity proposal for directors' incentive compensation
as well. Director compensation typically consists of a cash component (called
the retainer), smaller cash amounts paid for attendance at board and committee
meetings, and incentive compensation in the form of stock and stock option
grants which vest over a period of time of a few years. While the theoretical
and empirical literature on executive compensation is extensive, the literature
on director compensation is relatively modest. We think that it is plausible to
assume that incentives operate similarly in both employment positions. If, for
example, directors can liquidate their vested stock and options, and a director
feels the need to liquidate the position in the near future, then the director may
focus on short-term performance that may be to the detriment of long-term
shareholder value and the public fisc. It would therefore be prudent for bank
director incentive compensation to be structured along the lines of the
Restricted Equity proposal advanced for bank executives.
B. Comparison to Regulatory Initiatives
Regulatory initiatives regarding bankers' incentive compensation have
emphasized the use of equity (as opposed to cash) bonuses, deferral, and
clawbacks, to achieve compensation that does not encourage untoward risk-
taking. These are features of worldwide regulation because the approach -
reducing incentives for excessive risk-taking - was incorporated into the Basel
Committee's supervisory principles at the direction of the G-20, and all nations
in which globally important banks are located (as they are all members of the
Basel committee), as well as many others, have enacted compliant regulation.52
The G-20 incentive compensation principles did not mandate any particular
design or structure, but by requiring that incentive compensation be adjusted
for risk, be symmetric with risk outcomes and be sensitive to the time horizon
51. If only some banks adopt the Restricted Equity proposal, that could lead to a
selection effect whereby only risk-takers, or risk-avoiders, agree to work for those firms, compared to
firms providing incentive compensation vesting over a shorter horizon, and those individuals opt for
management policies that take on either too much, or too little, risk. However, this is not an insoluble
issue. As previously noted, there are data indicating that boards adjust bank managers' incentive
compensation in conjunction with changes in a bank's risk. See supra note 44. Further, bank regulators
could exercise supervisory discretion to provide more favorable regulatory treatment to banks that have
adopted the Restricted Equity proposal, by, for example, requiring banks to hold higher capital if they
have not adopted that approach.




of risks, they were universally interpreted to require deferred equity
compensation and clawbacks.
The G-20 incentive compensation principles were subsequently clarified
and operationalized into implementation standards. The standards suggest that
a "substantial portion of incentive compensation be variable, of which "a
substantial proportion, such as more than 50%" should be equity-based, and of
which "a substantial proportion... such as 40 to 60%" should be deferred for at
least three years.54 Deferred equity compensation is, of course, at the heart of
our proposal. But as this guidance makes clear, regulators have not gone so far
as to require banks to adopt all equity based incentive compensation or long-
term vesting periods that extend beyond retirement or resignation, as we
recommend. Hence, in our judgment, bank compensation committees should
not settle for mere compliance with the suggested standards, as they fall well
short of adequately guarding against excessive risk-taking, nor should banking
regulators shrink from further scrutinizing bank activities where incentive
compensation packages merely meet the implementation standards.
The implementation standards address the symmetric risk principle by
requiring that a substantial proportion of the variable equity compensation be
subject to a share retention policy, with the unvested component of that
deferred compensation to be subject to clawback upon "negative contributions"
(i.e., poor realized performance) of the firm and business line. Congress
codified clawbacks for all firms in the Sarbanes Oxley Act and the 2009
stimulus package, with further elaboration in Dodd-Frank, laying out as a
specific trigger an accounting restatement. 56 Dodd-Frank, for instance,
mandates SEC rulemaking to require issuers with accounting restatements to
recover from any executive officer the amount of incentive compensation,
received in a three-year window prior to the restatement, which was in excess
of what the individual would have received had the accounting statements been
correct.
Clawback provisions such as those in Dodd-Frank are not, in our
judgment, as effective an incentive mechanism as the Restricted Equity
proposal. They are inherently difficult to compute (e.g., it is unclear how to
53. Id. The motivation for greater specification of the agreed-upon compensation
principles was not solely to enhance the stability of the global financial system, but also to establish a
"level playing field" across international banks' compensation practices. By limiting discretion
regarding the principles' content, the expectation was that supervisory demands would be more uniform
and international banks' compensation practices would more readily converge. Id. at 1.
54. FIN. STABILITY BOARD, FSB PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND COMPENSATION
PRACTICES: IMPLEMENTATION STANDARDS 3 (2009), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/public
ations/r_090925c.pdf.
55. Id. The principles, by contrast, simply stated that bonuses should diminish or
disappear upon poor performance, without specifying amounts subject to specific clawback. FIN.
STABILITY FORUM, supra note 1, at 3.
56. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11-5, 7001,123
Stat. 115 (2009) (hereinafter "Stimulus Bill"); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 304,
15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006); Dodd-Frank, supra note 50, § 954.
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calculate the Dodd-Frank clawback measure when the award is not based on an
accounting target), and entail litigation costs of uncertain dimension at
present. Further, specific triggers for clawbacks are blunt instruments:
excessive risk-taking causing firm losses need not produce a restatement (the
decline in value of large financial institutions during the financial crisis was not
accompanied by, or in response to, accounting restatements), nor might a three-
year horizon be enough time for a flawed investment or trading strategy to be
revealed.
By contrast, the Restricted Equity proposal has an inherent "clawback"
feature that renders unnecessary intricate mechanisms requiring repayments of
bonuses on income from transactions whose value proved illusory. Because
executives are compensated in equity that is not received until years after it is
earned-two to four years after they leave the firm-they cannot capture short-
lived income from transactions whose value is not long-lasting. The
compensation will be dissipated as the value of the firm's shares decline upon
the realization of the transaction's losses. In other words, executives will
receive less in value than the originally granted bonus compensation if the
stock price drops thereafter. This automatic "clawback" is, accordingly, simpler
to administer than the specified regulatory clawbacks, avoiding definitional,
and consequently litigation, pitfalls.
57. See, e.g., Mary Hughes, Clawbacks Gain Favor, Raise Issues In Absence of
Guidance, Speakers Say, 11 Corporate Accountability Report (BNA) 685 (2013). For instance,
companies adopting clawback policies to comply with Dodd-Frank face the prospect of uncertain
litigation costs because under most states' law, wages "once earned" cannot be clawed back. Therefore,
companies will not be able to exercise "self-help" and achieve a clawback by not paying part or all of a
current salary or bonus, but will have to sue an individual who does not voluntarily repay the amount in
question for the funds. Id. There is also the prospect of costly litigation in the SEC's enforcement of the
Sarbanes Oxley clawback provision. A few non-culpable executives, rather than settle, have challenged
being subjected to a clawback without individual wrongdoing or knowledge. Although two district
courts have rejected executives' motions to dismiss on that ground, SEC v. Baker, No. A-12-CA-285-SS
(W.D. Tex., Nov. 13, 2012); SEC v. Jenkins, No. 2:09-CV-1510-GMS (D. Ariz. June 9, 2010), the issue
is still unsettled. That is because one of the courts also found that the statute could raise constitutional
issues of "severe andunjustified" deprivation but that such issues could not be decided on a motion to
dismiss, SEC v. Jenkins, supra, at 9. Finally, there are also tax complications with clawbacks: under the
"claim of right" doctrine, an individual has to pay tax on compensation received in a given year, even if
he may "later be required to repay it." None of these additional complications would arise under the
Restricted Equity proposal, while the executive would also not be able to reap inapposite gains from
incentive compensation.
58. Bernard Hirsch et al. advance a further objection to clawbacks, that they may
have the unintended consequence of increasing risk-taking. They hypothesize that clawbacks will have a
differential impact on decision-making depending on a firm's financial position, and that where the
investment outcome only affects the size of a loss, the manager with a clawback will select the riskiest
project, as with a higher variance, it offers a possibility of reducing the extent of the loss, and hence the
amount of compensation clawed back. Bernard Hirsch, Bernhard E. Reichert & Matthias Sohn, Does
Holding Managers Accountable by Extending the Scope of Clawback Provisions in Incentive Contracts
Backfire and Lead to More Risk Taking by Distorting Information Processing? (May 23, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract-2312487. They provide findings from a laboratory
experiment that support the hypothesis, as in the setting of a loss position, individuals with clawback
compensation contracts opted more frequently for the riskier of two projects, than those without
clawbacks. Id. at 2-4.
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The EU has gone further than the G-20 and Basel-endorsed approach and
capped bankers' incentive pay to no more than the individual's fixed salary.59
In our judgment, a proposal could not be more wrong-headed than that
legislation if the objective is to incentivize bank executives to maximize firm
value and reduce excessive risk.6o There is a well-developed and widely
accepted economics literature on how to achieve consonance between
managers' actions and shareholders' interest through the use of incentive stock
* 61- - *and option compensation. The less the executive receives in incentive
compensation, the less he or she will be motivated to act so as to maximize
share value. The core problem of excessive risk-taking is not one of
compensation levels, but of compensation structure. Moreover, the likely result
of any restriction capping one component of compensation is to increase
another component. As the original package proportions would have reflected a
market equilibrium package maximizing employee utility, the new package will
be inefficient, i.e., the mandated change will require a compensating adjustment
62that costs the firm more than before. In short, such a restriction will make pay
even less sensitive to performance than it was before the crisis, which is the
precise opposite of what is desirable in an incentive compensation plan.
59. See supra note 1. In 2009, for a brief period some U.S. banks were subject to a
similar restriction: Congress limited the incentive pay of executives of firms receiving TARP funds to
1/3 of their annual compensation, Stimulus bill, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, supra note
56, § 7001. But all of the TARP-recipient banks rapidly paid off their TARP obligations and exited the
program. BHAGAT & ROMANO, LONG-TERM, supra note 2, at 140. No doubt, avoiding the restrictions
on compensation provided a powerful incentive to do so.
60. It is, of course, quite possible that the motivation of members of the European
Parliament adopting the cap was to punish bank employees and express moral outrage at their outsized
pay packages and not to affect banks' risk-taking incentives. In our judgment, if that was the motivation,
then the solution is misplaced, as it undermines the fashioning of an effective compensation system for
banks, and concerns over income inequality are best addressed by national tax and transfer systems.
61. E.g., Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. EcON. 74
(1979); Bengt Holmstrom, Managerial Incentive Problems-A Dynamic Perspective, 66 REV. ECON.
STUD. 169 (1999).
62. Evidence can be adduced of the perverse effects of government efforts to
restrict the amount of executive compensation. For example, after U.S. corporate tax-deductible pay was
limited to $1 million for fixed compensation but not for performance-based pay, firms altered the mix of
compensation to reduce cash salaries and increase incentive compensation. See Tod Perry & Mark
Zenner, Pay for Performance? Government Regulation and the Structure of Compensation Contracts 17
(June 2000) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfi?abstractid=60956. Some
commentators attribute the mushrooming of equity incentive compensation and hence executive pay in
the 1990s, along with the excessive risk-taking of the 2000s, to that reform. E.g., Bruce Bartlett, Not so
Suite: Clinton Tax Law is the Problem, Not Greedy Execs, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (Sept. 25, 2002, 9:00
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/nrofbarlett/bartlett92502.asp. A similar reaction appears to be
occurring in Europe: 65% of U.K. financial services companies increased the base salary of their
employees by over 20% in anticipation of the incoming cap. See, e.g., Daniel Schafer, Salaries Lifted to
Beat Bonus Cap, FIN. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 2013, 5:32 PM, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0ff854c2-08e4-l1e3-
ad07-00l44feabdcO.html. For a similar criticism of the EU initiative see Kevin J. Murphy, Regulation
Banking Bonuses in the European Union: A Case Study in Unintended Consequences, 19 EUR. FIN.
MGT. J. 631 (2013). As earlier noted, we recognize that the Restricted Equity proposal may have this
type of effect, and suggest means by which it can be mitigated: increasing award amounts to compensate
for increased under-diversification and permitting modest liquidation of annual awards.
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C. Comparison to Debt-Based Compensation Proposals
As earlier noted, a number of recent reform proposals have advocated
compensating bank managers with a share of the bank's debt securities, rather
than (or in addition to) equity-based incentive pay.63 Although specifics of the
proposed debt or debt-like compensation differ, the rationale is the same: to
address the moral hazard, or agency problem of debt, using an idea first
advanced by Michael Jensen and William Meckling in a classic article
published over thirty years ago, to compensate managers with debt as well as
stock to mitigate equity's incentive, in a levered firm, to take on increasingly
risky projects because it obtains the entire upside but does not have to pay
creditors in full on the downside, given limited liability. 4 Deposit insurance
exacerbates the moral hazard problem because the government stands behind
the equity holders, and it reduces creditors' incentives to monitor managers'
risk-taking or otherwise seek contractual protections against risk-taking. Of
course, this moral hazard problem resulting in a threat to the fisc is universally
recognized: banks are for this very reason subject to extensive supervision,
regulation and examination.
All of the debt-based proposals are, in our judgment, inferior to our
Restricted Equity proposal, particularly given the earlier noted desirable
property that compensation plans be simple to understand, implement and
monitor, as well as be aligned with long-term firm value. First, reform
proposals advocating a package of equity and debt or debt-like securities are far
more complex and opaque than the Restricted Equity proposal. For example,
most senior securities of financial institutions are either not publicly traded or
63. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers'Pay, 98 GEO.
L.J. 247 (2010) (recommending compensation package of a proportionate mix of financial institutions'
senior securities-debt and preferred stock-and equity); PATRICK BOLTON, HAMID MEHRAN & JOEL
SHAPIRO, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND RISK-TAKING, STAFF REPORT
NO. 456 (2010) (recommending tying compensation to changes in the spread on credit default swaps,
which are contracts written on debt securities that insure the holder against the debt's default); Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in Financial Firms: The Case for
Convertible Equity-Based Pay, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 834 (advocating conversion of financial
institutions' senior management's equity-based compensation into subordinated debt at a discount to the
equity value, when a firm experiences financial difficulty); Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in
Executive Compensation, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1821 (2012) (recommending use of contingent
convertible bonds with an early conversion trigger); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance:
Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1205 (2011)
(recommending compensation in the form of subordinated debt of the bank subsidiary). A detailed
discussion of what are, in our judgment, feasibility and transparency problems with the Bebchuk-
Spamann proposal that make it inferior to our restricted stock proposal, is provided in Bhagat &
Romano, Simplicity, supra note 2. We discuss here the overall shortcomings of debt-focused
compensation proposals.
64. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 352 (1976). Jeffery Gordon
further advocates the use of contingent debt compensation on the rationale that management with a large
block of equity will not raise needed additional equity capital at a time of financial distress in order to
avoid dilution of their ownership. Gordon, supra note 63. But see infra Section IV.B for our discussion




trade very infrequently; the absence of market prices renders it difficult to value
debt-based compensation packages. In addition, given that firms' capital
structures are dynamic, changing over time, executives' portfolios will require
frequent rebalancing to maintain proportionate holdings, upon issuance of new
securities, or receipt of incentive compensation, to ensure maintenance of the
proportions, which will require a complicated, and therefore costly,
administration.
Proposals that advocate pegging compensation to a specific debt security,
such as credit default swaps, rather than a proportionate package of the capital
structure, while seemingly avoiding complexity, do not satisfactorily avoid the
problem, as those securities are typically not publicly traded.65 They are also
issued by only the largest financial institutions, and therefore are not suitable
for executive compensation in medium- and small-sized financial institutions.
Finally, determining the appropriate formula with which to relate changes in
default spreads to executive compensation bonuses or clawbacks would
undoubtedly be challenging, for the calculation of swap prices is complex, as
values do not change linearly with changes in other economic variables. 66
Second, government bail-outs of banks, particularly in the 2008 global
financial crisis, have by and large focused on bailing out creditors, not
shareholders. Given that experience, providing a portion of bank executives'
compensation in debt would not lead the executives to take a socially optimal
level of lower risk, as they could quite plausibly conclude that they need not
expect to lose the value of debt securities on the downside while they will still
expect to obtain the upside on the equity portion. If the executives' debt is
65. Besides the lack of transparency from the absence of market pricing, because
credit default swap spreads are computed using accounting figures which are partially under managers'
control, they may also be subject to manipulation, as managers will have increased incentives to
misrepresent figures used in swap pricing when it immediately will impact their compensation.
Although credit default swaps have historically traded in private over-the-counter markets, Dodd-Frank
requires regulators to implement rules to establish the use of centralized clearing exchanges to trade
these products, which could increase the transparency of prices, but will not eliminate the need for
accounting data to calculate the spreads, as the underlying debt is infrequently traded. The convertible
security proposed by Gordon, supra note 63, has further valuation difficulties: because management's
stock differs significantly from that of outside stockholders (i.e., their shares will become debt securities,
which are senior to the outstanding shares of the stockholders, when the firm experiences financial
difficulty), their stock will not be equivalent in value, nor will its value move in tandem with the value
of, the outstanding common stock. Moreover, determining the value of management's equity will be
complicated because it depends on the likelihood of conversion, and the rate that will be applicable
(which under the proposal requires a further probability calculation of the value of the common stock at
an unknown point in time that is prior to the moment at which conversion occurs). Finally, the possible
conversion into debt at a discount reduces the value of stock compensation to an executive and
consequently, the executive will require a higher amount of equity to offset the lower valuation (i.e., the
increased risk).
66. In discussing the formal model underlying their proposal to tie bank executives'
compensation to credit default swap spreads, the optimal compensation contract consists of debt and
equity in a ratio equal to the "rate of return promised to bondholders at the optimal risk level," which, as
Bolton and colleagues note, "may be difficult to calculate." Bolton et al., supra note 63, at 13. In our
judgment, this statement is gentle. As all of the proposal's incentives operate through the debt portion of
compensation (the risk of default), from an incentive perspective it is closer to Tung's all-debt proposal
than the proportional capital structure package proposed by Bebchuk and Spamann.
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written so as to not be able to participate in a government bailout, then those
securities would be of lesser value than those sold to investors, whose prices
and terms incorporate the reasonable expectation of a bailout should the
institution fail, rendering market prices, such as exist for the debt, inapposite
for valuing the executive's compensation. Yet that is the linchpin of such
proposals, in which price signals of the riskiness of the debt, such as a bank's
credit-default swap spread, or proportionate values of debt and equity
securities, determine the executive's compensation.
Third, although in theory a manager holding a mix of debt and equity
securities might not take on inappropriate risk, it might well be otherwise. The
gain on an equity position from following a high risk strategy might well
exceed the loss on the position attributable to senior securities in the
executive's portfolio. Moreover, if the value of the equity position is quite low
compared to the senior securities in a compensation package, a manager would
still have an incentive to take on risky projects, given the option value of the
position each year. Furthermore, the incentive to undertake riskier projects
would be greater than the incentive to take on such projects created by our
Restricted Equity proposal because with restricted stock, the option value
cannot be realized until years after the manager is no longer with the firm.
Indeed, as we discussed earlier, incentive compensation paid in the form of
restricted stock is more likely to decrease than increase managers' risk-taking,
as it increases the under-diversification of executive portfolios, in addition to
the long-term holding period for the stock.
The concern over moral hazard in relation to bank risk-taking induced by
deposit insurance which motivates the proposals to use debt for bank
executives' incentive compensation, is, of course, as we have noted, well-
recognized, and we do not wish to dismiss its seriousness; that is a reason why
financial institutions are our specific focus. But we think it is daunting to
determine, no less effectively implement, an optimal incentive compensation
structure combining debt and equity. It would in fact be extraordinarily difficult
to determine how the incentives would work, i.e., how managers would react,
67. It would also further separate the executives' incentives from that of the firm's
security holders, and as such could result in negative enterprise value, given the research relating
executives' fixed claims to firm value. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
68. Stock in a levered firm, from a finance perspective, is equivalent to an option on
the firm, in which the equity holder obtains the upside of future risky projects but can walk away from
the firm, without repaying creditors, if the firm's downside value is less than its liabilities. Richard
Lambert et al. model when stock option compensation results in managers taking less or more risk
(which depends on how "in the money"-i.e., by how much the exercise price is below the stock price-
the options are). Richard A. Lambert, David F. Larcker & Robert E. Verrecchia, Portfolio
Considerations in Valuing Executive Compensation, 29 J. ACCT. REs. 129 (1991). The model indicates
that managers are more likely to take on risk when the probability of the option finishing in the money is
low, as in the scenario in the text, and thus of greatest concern to the fisc. With restricted stock, the
longer horizon increases the probability that an option will finish in the money, which, in the Lambert et




to such compensation.69 Moreover, the problem becomes more acute if the
manager's loyalty is divided across firm stakeholders, as would be the case in
these complicated multi-security structured compensation packages. If we
move out of the realm of decisions regarding a specific investment, such as
selling a particular structured product, to higher level firm decision issues, the
manager may not make decisions to maximize firm value, as the conflicts of
interest across the classes of securities may make it difficult, if not impossible,
to determine the appropriate course to follow, with the result that the manager
instead maximizes her own utility. 70
Finally, the empirical research on which some debt-based compensation
advocates offer in support of their proposals - that firms whose executives
receive higher deferred compensation and pension benefits, which are
considered to be debt-like as they are unsecured future claims, are less risky -
when evaluated more closely, we believe, cuts against the position.7 1 That
research also finds that as the level of deferred compensation and pension
benefits rises, total enterprise value falls (i.e., increases in debt values are
swamped by decreases in equity value). To avoid such an outcome, the
compensation package must mirror exactly the firm's total security package,
which, as we have already discussed, is practically impossible to implement. A
rational incentive compensation plan should not, of course, create negative firm
value. Thus, it would be extraordinarily important to get the amount of debt
held compared to stock precisely correct, which requires perfectly paralleling
the firm's total package of securities, a feat, as we have discussed, that will be
close to impossible to accomplish.
There is a further problem with debt-based incentive compensation from a
social welfare point of view: it is not desirable from society's' perspective to
run banks in debtholders' rather than shareholders' interest because banks that
seek to minimize risk-taking might be induced to restrict their lending, and lend
only to the safest borrowers, a business strategy, which, as seen in the post-
crisis economy-wide recession, is not conducive to economic growth. As
elaborated in the next part, we think instead that the moral hazard or agency
costs of debt problem is best addressed directly by regulation raising bank
69. See Kelli A. Alces & Brian D. Galle, The False Promise of Risk-Reducing
Incentive Pay: Evidence from Executive Pensions and Deferred Compensation, 38 J. CORP. L. 53 (2012)
(critiquing debt-based bank executive incentive compensation proposals that emphasizes behavioral
economic difficulties).
70. For a classic exposition of the well-known difficulty of collective choice and the
reason for corporate law's restriction of managers' fiduciary duty to shareholders, see Henry Hansmann,
Ownership of the Firm, 4 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 267 (1988).
71. E.g., Bolton et al., supra note 63, at 2. The key article assessing the impact of
deferred compensation on stock and bond value uses the change in SEC disclosure rules that first
required firms to reveal such holdings, to evaluate the impact. Chenyang Wei & David Yermack,
Investor Reactions to CEOs' Inside Debt Incentives, 24 REv. FIN. STUD. 3813 (2011). Deferred
compensation and pension benefits are referred to in the literature as "inside debt." For a further critique
of relying on research on "inside debt" to advocate debt-based compensation, see Alces & Galle, supra
note 69.
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capital requirements, or changes in the forms of debt issued, such as greater use
of hybrid debt instruments which convert to equity in specified adverse states
of the world. By revising the capital structure to make the probability of
insolvency from a tail event less probable, the Restricted Equity proposal
would operate in the range in which bank managers' incentives, aligned with
long-term share value-maximization, will also be aligned with long-term firm
value-maximization. Indeed, for most states of the world, banks operate in an
area, far from insolvency, in which equity rather than debt-based compensation
provides superior incentives for firm value-maximization.
IV. Capital Structure and Executive Compensation
We advocate two approaches, not necessarily exclusive, to bank capital
structure reform that, coupled with the Restricted Equity proposal, should
incentivize bank executives not to take on projects of excessive risk:
meaningful higher capital requirements and mandatory issuance of CoCos.
While we do not have unique insights on the issues, we think the evidence is
compelling that not only pre-crisis but also post-crisis regulatory capital
requirements were and are too low. But concurrently, in all truth, the optimal
level of capital is both unknown and in all likelihood unknowable.
Consequently, we believe that the best means of ascertaining what amount of
capital should be required is by creating a mechanism to facilitate regulatory
diversity within the global financial regulatory regime through which nations
can experiment with different approaches to enhancing capital requirements
beyond Basel III's strictures. By such a mechanism, information will be
generated concerning what works best under varying circumstances, improving
the quality of decision-making and the resiliency of the global financial system.
A. Raising and Simplifying Bank-Capital Requirements
Large international banks' capital requirements have been globally
harmonized, under the Basel accords, since 1988. Basel capital calculations
take into account an asset's risk, that is, banks are required to hold more capital
for riskier assets, such as corporate loans, than they are required to hold for
what are considered safer assets, such as government debt. The initial accord
has been revised several times, with each succeeding revision resulting in more
complex calculations of risk, and layered on top of existing provisions. Under
Basel I, regulators established standardized risk weights for broad categories of
assets. Banks were then required to hold a minimum of 8% capital against those
72assets. The standardized approach was emended under Basel II for the largest
72. For example, if a bank made a loan to a business of $1 million, given the 100%
risk weight for such assets, the bank would need capital in the amount of 8% x 100% x $1 million =
$80,000. By contrast, if it used the same $1 million to buy a U.S. treasury bond, given the 0% risk




banks to apply a methodology by which regulators enlist banks' own more
sophisticated internal risk management models to determine their risk-based
capital requirements ("Internal Ratings Based" or "IRB").73
Following the global financial crisis, the accord was further amended, first
(Basel 2.5) to increase the capital requirements for securitized and off-balance-
sheet assets at the core of the global crisis that had had preferential treatment,
and then (Basel III) to add a further capital conservation buffer equal to 2.5%
of risk-weighted assets to the existing 8% minimum capital requirement, along
with a 3% leverage ratio and requirements to hold a specified amount of liquid
assets. 74 A leverage ratio calculates the amount of capital in proportion to total
assets independent of risk. Although new to international regulation, U.S.
banking regulators had long imposed a 4% leverage ratio on domestic banks in
addition to the Basel risk-weighted minimum capital requirement. 75
The post-crisis refinements to Basel II also expanded the assets against
which capital must be held, increased the risk weights allocated to specific
assets, and restricted the definition of bank capital, such that even without the
additional capital buffer (which has a long phase-in period) and despite
retaining the Basel II capital minimum, banks would have to hold more capital
than previously if they were not to alter the composition of their portfolios in
response. The final piece of Basel III is an agreement by the Basel Committee
that the largest, globally systemically important banks ("G-SIBs") should be
subject to enhanced capital requirements. G-SIBs will be classified into
different "buckets" according to the institution's systemic importance, with the
value remaining unchanged. Bank regulatory capital is divided into two tiers, with Tier 1 consisting
essentially of common stock, and Tier 2 including additional instruments, such as specified forms of
subordinated debt. Under Basel I, half of the required capital amount (or 4%) had to be met with Tier 1
capital. These are accounting capital ratios, that is, Tier I is computed according to the book value, not
market value, of the bank's common stock.
73. IRB was intended to address regulatory arbitrage opportunities created by the
arbitrary requirements of the standardized approach, such as, for instance, banks cherry-picking assets
within a category to increase their yield, i.e., the riskiest assets, without incurring an increased capital
charge because the standardized risk categories were insensitive to the risk of specific borrowers or
assets within the class. E.g., DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL 80-82 (2008) (discussing
regulatory arbitrage opportunities afforded by Basel 1). For a discussion of the operation of capital
requirements under both accords as well as a critique of IRB, see id.
74. Basel III requires that 6% of the total 8% capital requirement be Tier 1 capital,
and of that, 4.5% must be equity. The minimum capital requirements are to be phased in by 2015 while
the phase in of the conservation buffer and leverage ratio requirements will not be completed until 2019
and 2018, respectively. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING
SYSTEMS 69 (rev. June 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.htm. The Basel III minimum capital and
conservation buffer requirements are said to have been determined by the loss experience of large banks
over the past decade and in the 2008 crisis, respectively. Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics:
Regulating Systemically Important Financial Firms 8 (June 3, 2011) (transcript available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20110603a.htm).
75. Continuing with the $1 million loan example in note 72, supra, under the
leverage ratio requirement, the bank must hold the same amount of capital against a $1 million asset,
whether it is a corporate loan or a treasury bond, of 4% x $1 million = $40,000 (or under Basel III, 3% x
$1 million = $30,000).
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surcharge of additional risk-weighted capital ranging from 1 to 2.5% (as no
banks will be placed into the highest bucket calling for 3.5%).7 As with the
capital conservation buffer, if a G-SIB's capital falls below the required
surcharge, it will be penalized by restrictions on payouts to shareholders and
employees, along with development of a remediation plan to increase its
capital, rather than be subjected to more stringent corrective action, as could
occur on a breach of minimum capital requirements. 7
Although the increase in capital requirements is a move in the right
direction, to our minds the Basel III level is still too low for comfort for
reducing incentives to take excessive risk. We come to this understanding by
reference, as a benchmark, to the level of capital held by banks pre-crisis, and
the level that markets required of banks before governments stepped in to
insure depositors. Consider first pre-crisis capital levels: a comprehensive study
of leverage across banks and countries indicates that at the start of the financial
crisis, U.S. banks' average capital was approximately 10-12% (that is, around
90% of their capital structure consisted of debt securities). At a debt level of
90%, a market shock adversely affecting asset value of slightly over 2% could
push a firm below the minimum capital requirement, subjecting it to corrective
regulatory action, and such firms' executives would therefore be operating in
what is analogous to the insolvency zone for nonfinancial firms, in which
managers' incentives and shareholders' interest align in taking high risk
gambles on firm value due to limited liability.
Moreover, although from the perspective of capital regulation pre-crisis
banks might have appeared to be well capitalized, as they were operating above
the regulatory minimum threshold, the financial crisis demonstrated that
76. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS: UPDATED ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND THE HIGHER
LOSS ABSORBENCY REQUIREMENT (2013), http://www.bis.orgIpubl/bcbs255.htm. The additional capital
must be Tier 1 capital. The Basel Committee document states that national regulators may impose higher
requirements on their G-SIBs, which is the implicit understanding for all Basel requirements, and no
doubt was an acknowledgement that members of the committee were intending to do so. U.S. banking
regulators, for instance, have proposed a leverage ratio of 5% for the largest bank holding companies
and 6% for their bank subsidiaries. U.S. Treas. Dep't, Fed. Res. Sys., FDIC, Regulatory Capital Rules:
Regulatory Capital, Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio Standards for Certain Bank Holding
Companies and their Subsidiary Insured Depository Institutions, _ Fed. Reg. _ (July 2013). They were
directed by Congress to impose an additional leverage requirement on such institutions. See Dodd-
Frank, supra note 50, § 165.
77. The G-SIB surcharge is subject to as long a phase-in as the capital buffer, by
2019. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 76, at 15.
78. See Scbnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Bent Sorensen & Sevcan Yesiltas, Leverage
Across Firms, Banks, and Countries, 88 J. INT'L ECON. 284 (2012). Because they are derived from
publicly disclosed information, these data are simple leverage ratios, not Basel risk-weighted ratios.
They also do not include off-balance sheet assets (given the limitation of the data), but those assets were,
for the most part, also not included in the Basel risk weight calculation. The average level of debt was
considerably higher at the former investment banks and European banks (firms that were not subject to a
leverage ratio). See Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Banking on the State,
Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's Twelfth Annual International Banking Conference
(Sept. 25, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.bis.org/review/r09111le.pdf) (connecting this




assumption was mistaken.79 Yet Basel III will raise the amount of required
equity only to 4.5% (the minimum Tier 1 equity capital requirement). Such a
requirement would hardly appear to be sufficient to withstand a repeat of the
recent near catastrophic collapse of short-term financing markets and the
banking sector, in which the shock to asset values was as large as the amount of
banks' capital (that is, some large banks' equity declined from 10% to near
zero).8 0
In line with this intuitive assessment, a study estimating the probability of
bank losses in financial crises estimates the probability of a shock of the
magnitude of a 10% decline in banks' risk-weighted assets is approximately
2.5% (a shock that has occurred historically once every 40 years)."' If risk-
weighted assets equaled half of a bank's assets, 82 and its remaining safe assets
were unaffected, then with such a shock the current minimum capital ratio
would be insufficient. Adding in the 2.5% capital conservation buffer, on the
assumption that bank managers will not want to cut off dividends and bonuses,
would render the bank capable of weathering such a storm. However, the
assumption that the value of assets to which no risk-weights are attached will
be unaffected when there is such an extreme market shock to risk-weighted
assets would seem problematic, given recent experience. In the Eurozone
sovereign debt crisis following in the wake of the global financial crisis that
began with a market shock to subprime mortgage securities, the value of many
sovereigns' debt, previously perceived as a safe asset, precipitously cratered.
Consider, second, historical capital levels. Prior to the introduction of
deposit insurance, U.S. banks routinely held capital over 20%.3 This level
would appear to have been market-driven, as it exceeded (indeed was unrelated
to) the amount required by regulation at the time. For instance, some states
79. Basel advocates could, no doubt, contend that the pre-crisis ratios were
misleading as in retrospect it is clear that both banks and regulators inadequately measured the risk of
assets, such as securitized mortgages, and that Basel III has sorted that out. But while that may be so,
there is no reason to believe that the methodology is now sufficiently accurate such that some other
asset's future risk will not prove to be greater than the weight that has been currently assigned, creating
another crisis. It is true that banks will tend to hold more capital than the minimum requirement in order
to avoid being pushed below the minimum by a small shock and thereby be subjected to regulatory
corrective action, but the regulatory objective should be to establish a sufficient minimum against tail
risk, independent of whether banks might hold a cushion of capital above that minimum.
80. DARRELL DUFFIE, How BIG BANKS FAIL AND WHAT TO Do ABouT IT 48
(2010). Citigroup illustrates the problem. Its Tier 1 capital ratio never fell below 7% during the financial
crisis yet its stock market capitalization declined to approximately 1% of its total accounting assets. Id.
81. David Miles, Jing Yang & Gilberto Marcheggiano, Optimal Bank Capital, 123
ECON. J. 1, 24 (2013).
82. Id. at 21. This is approximately the percentage held by large U.K. banks in
recent years. Id.
83. See e.g., Haldane, supra note 78, at 14; Tarullo, supra note 73, at 31. There is
striking suggestive evidence that the market priced the probability of the moral hazard problem caused
by limited liability in relation to bank capital: In states where bank shareholders had liability for a
proportion of a bank's debt beyond what they had invested (referred to as "double" liability), the
average capital ratios were lower at 18.2% compared to 22.9% for banks in states where shareholders
did not have such liability. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank
Shareholders: History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 35, 59-60 (1992).
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during this period required banks to hold a capital to deposit ratio of 10%, and
national banks were subject to a similar requirement as of 1914.84 U.K. banks
similarly had much higher capital, with leverage into the 1960s equal to half the
rate of recent decades.85 The higher level of capital held in the pre-deposit
insurance world suggests that is the level at which creditors expected bank
management's risk-taking to be controlled. In our judgment, this is probative
evidence that Basel requirements are too low, for it suggests that creditors are
willing to invest in banks with today's lower level of equity because of the
modem phenomenon of government bailouts, in which all creditors, not just
insured depositors, are covered. 8 6 We should note that a number of
commentators have similarly advocated capital requirements significantly
higher than 10%.8 And the Swiss banking regulators, who have had a
reputation for probity, are evidently of that view, as they have required their
largest banks to meet a capital requirement of 19% (10% of which must be
equity).88
However, we quite candidly admit that beyond the general statement that
current capital levels (including Basel's phased increase to roughly 10%) would
appear to be inadequate, we do not have a precise answer to the question what
is the optimal capital requirement. We also think that is an answer no one can
provide with confidence, and for any answer there will be considerable room
for reasonable disagreement.89 One compelling explanation why it is
84. Tarullo, supra note 73, at 29.
85. Miles et al., supra note 81, at 3-4; see also Haldane, supra note 78, at 14
(explaining that capital ratios for U.K. banks were over 10% until around WW I).
86. It should also be noted that European banks, which have been more highly
levered than U.S. banks, have issued large amounts of "covered" bonds, in which, creditors have claims
upon specific collateral for repayment. E.g. INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY
REPORT: TRANSITION CHALLENGES TO STABILITY 109 (2013), http://www.imf.org/externall
pubs/ft/gfsr/2013/02/pdf/text.pdf; Simon Constable, In Translation: Covered Bonds, WALL ST. J., July
9, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl0001424052702303665904577450733636151106.
87. Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts and Myths: Why Bank Equity
is Not Expensive 58 (Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 2065, 2011) ("[E]quity capital ratios
significantly higher than 10% of un-weighted assets should be seriously considered."); ANAT ADMATI &
MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS' NEW CLOTHES 179-82, 189 (2013) (advocating capital leverage
ratios of 20-30%, allowing for time-varying regulation of minimum 20% capital in recessionary times
and maximum 30% in good times); Miles, Yang & Marcheggiano, supra note 81, at 2, 29 (positing that
results of a model empirically estimating the benefit of reducing financial crises against the cost of
increasing borrowing costs "suggest that the optimal amount of capital is likely to be around twice as
great" as Basel III's capital requirements for largest banks of " just under 10% of risk-weighted assets,"
and further specifying a range of 16-20%); see also Meilan Yan, Maximilian J.B. Hall & Paul Turner, A
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Basel III: Some Evidence from the UK 14 (Aug. 20, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract-1913433 (suggesting that the optimal level of tangible common
equity to risk-weighted assets for U.K. banks is 10%, which is considerably higher than the Basel III
target of 7%).
88. FED. DEP'T OF FIN., SWISS CONFEDERATION, STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL
SECTOR STABILITY, (2013), http://www.efd.admin.ch/themen/wirtschaft waehrung/02315/.
89. We will return to this issue in Section IV.C, where we advance the use of
national regulatory experimentation to get a better handle on the answer to that question. The previously
mentioned models estimating optimal capital levels, Miles et al., supra note 81, and Yan et al., supra




problematic to fix an optimal capital level is that the requisite amount (such as
the amount determined as necessary for a bank to withstand a specified level of
shock to assets at a specified probability of occurrence) changes with the nature
of a bank's assets and liability structure, which themselves change over time, as
a bank's business strategies, and relative asset values, change. 90 And as new
products are developed and business strategies change over time, any set of risk
weights from which a capital requirement is set is bound to become outdated
and inaccurate, lending themselves to regulatory arbitrage by which the bank's
actions can undermine compliance with capital requirements. In short, the
difficulty of making an optimal capital determination is exacerbated by the
innovation that occurs in financial products, whose risk cannot be anticipated
with confidence, in conjunction with the dynamic uncertainty of financial
markets, in which new risks are created as banks respond in imperfectly
predictable ways to capital regulation.
Although we do not have a firm conviction regarding how much above
10% capital requirements should be set, we do have a view on the form of the
requirement. We favor pegging capital to the leverage ratio (i.e., to total assets
independent of risk) over the risk-weighted capital approach that is at the core
of Basel. In this we endorse the position advocated by two experienced bank
regulators, Thomas Hoenig, Vice Chairman of the FDIC, and Andrew Haldane,
Executive Director, Financial Stability of the Bank of England. They have both
called for abandoning Basel III's complicated risk-weighted approach, favoring
leverage ratios (and in Haldane's case, combining their use with return to
simpler risk-weighted ratio calculations as well).91 Similarly, we contend that
raising capital levels, as are the models used by the Basel Committee to derive the G-SLB surcharge.
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 76, at 17-19.
90. Charles W. Calomiris & Richard J. Herring, Why and How to Design a
Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement, in ROCKY TIMES: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON FINANCIAL
STABILITY (Y. Fuchita et al. eds., 2012) . For a dynamic model of the appropriate leverage ratio (i.e., the
level of capital changes as investment parameters change over time), and the contention that current,
static capital requirements cannot provide a fully appropriate loss buffer, see Andrew W. Lo & Thomas
J. Brennan, Do Labyrinthine Legal Limits on Leverage Lessen the Likelihood of Losses? An Analytical
Framework, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1775 (2012).
91. Vice Chairman Hoenig voted against the Basel III rule implementation as
inadequate without a binding leverage constraint, Thomas Hoenig, Basel Ill Capital Interim Final Rule
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FDIC (July 9, 2013), https://www.fdic.gov/about/learn
/board/hoenig/statement7-9-2013.html, and has advocated that the United States take the lead and
abandon Basel III in favor of the ratio of tangible equity (i.e., excluding goodwill, tax assets and other
accounting entries) to tangible assets (assets less intangibles), Alan Zibel, FDIC's Hoenig: U.S. Should
Reject Basel Accord, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100
00872396390443524904577651551643632924. Haldane has called for simplifying Basel's capital
requirements to eliminate IRB and reemphasize standardized weights for broad asset classes and for
applying a stricter leverage ratio. Haldane, supra note 78; Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability,
Bank of Eng., The Dog and the Frisbee, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's 366th
Economic Policy Symposium (Aug. 31, 2012) (transcript available at
http://www.bis.org/review/rl20905a.pdf); see also Brooke Masters, Haldane Calls for Rethink ofBasel
III, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8a5e61b2-f34a-11el-9c6c-00144feabd
cO.html#axzz3AW3T6ktn. For a cogent summary of both regulators' positions, see Alex J. Pollock,
Hoenig and Haldane are Right About Basel III, AM. BANKER, Oct. 15, 2012, http://www.aei.org
/article/economics/financial-services/banking/hoenig-and-haldane-are-right-about-basel-iii/.
557
Yale Journal on Regulation
Basel's approach to capital needs to be recalibrated to emphasize the leverage
ratio over the risk-weighted minimum, which would require a leverage ratio far
higher than its present 3%, which has been set as a backstop to the risk-
weighted ratio, rather than the mainstay of capital requirements.
Hoenig's and Haldane's emphasis on the leverage ratio over risk-weighted
capital measurements is, in part, a reaction to Basel III's daunting complexity
and obscurity.92 As Haldane has remarked, Basel III's multiple requirements
and definitions of capital and risk-weight computations are so exceedingly
complicated that they now reach over 600 pages, compared to Basel I's 30 page
text, and for a large bank to comply it now requires several million
calculations, as opposed to Basel I's single figures.93 These data suggest that it
is, at present, all but impossible for any individual - investor, regulator, or bank
executive - to get a good handle on the risk that such institutions are bearing.
Moreover, in our judgment, as the complexity of the risk-weight
calculation has increased with each regulatory permutation, it magnifies what is
a behavioral constant in the financial regulatory landscape: banks will game
regulatory requirements to minimize the capital they must hold. It is axiomatic
that the more complicated the system, the more leeway banks will have to
engage in such activity, termed "regulatory arbitrage," reconfiguring their
portfolios to achieve the maximum risk with the minimum amount of capital. In
turn, the more room banks have to engage in such activity, the more difficult it
becomes for regulators and investors to evaluate bank capital and monitor
compliance.
The far simpler capital measure presented by a leverage ratio would cabin
banks' ability to engage in complex manipulation across risk weights and assets
to minimize their cost of capital. Importantly and relatedly, although it does not
prevent gaming by increasing the risk of assets held, a leverage ratio
requirement is easier for regulators and investors to monitor compliance, as
well as to evaluate banks' relative risk, as it will increase the comparability of
banks' risk and performance compared to the IRB approach. This would have a
beneficial feedback effect on bank managers' incentives to take risks, as better
informed investors and regulators better convey their preferences regarding
risk. Moreover, in the financial crisis, leverage ratios, and not Basel risk-
weighted capital, were associated with better stock performance, indicating that
investors perceive the leverage ratio as a superior indicator of the future risk of
a bank's portfolio.94 Accordingly, in our judgment, a substantially higher
92. For Hoenig's and Haldane's detailed critiques of Basel III, see Haldane, supra
note 91, and Thomas M. Hoenig, Vice Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Basel III Capital: A Well-
Intended Illusion, Remarks at the International Association of Deposit Insurers 2013 Research
Conference (Apr. 9, 2013) (transcript available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spapr
0913.html).
93. Haldane, supra note 91, at 6-7.
94. Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Enrica Detragiache & Ouarda Merrouche, Bank Capital:




capital requirement in the form of a leverage ratio is the regulatory reform most
consonant with advancing the Restricted Equity proposal's objective to reduce
excessive risk-taking of banks.
B. Requiring Capital in the Form of Contingent Convertible Debt
An alternative to raising capital requirements as the capital structure
reform to couple with the Restricted Equity proposal is to mandate a substantial
issuance of CoCos. In the wake of the global financial crisis, CoCos have been
the focus of increasing interest to bank regulators as they are thought by many
to be an efficacious means of capitalizing banks: there is a lower upfront cost,
compared to a straight equity issue, in using CoCos because the initial issue, as
a debt security, will have a lower cost of capital.95 CoCos are not merely a
theoretical concept: Swiss banks have sold such securities, as the Swiss
banking authorities, concurrently with dramatically increasing capital
requirements to 19%, permitted the instruments to qualify as capital (up to
9%).96
For CoCos to be an effective mechanism to complement the Restricted
Equity proposal, they must be structured so as to incentivize managers to issue
95. See, e.g., CALOMIRIS & HERRING, supra note 90. Calomiris and Herring identify
three objectives of CoCo proposals, the choice of which affects the instruments' design: (1) providing a
contingent cushion of equity capital to reduce the need for a government bailout upon a triggering event;
(2) providing a credible signal of default risk in the yield spread on the CoCo so that regulators can take
action before it is too late; and (3) incentivizing management to increase equity capital voluntarily in
order to avoid the highly dilutive action of a CoCo conversion. Id. at 11. Admati et al., supra note 87,
contend that equity capital should not cost more than debt capital, citing the Modigliani and Miller
("MM") theorem of the irrelevance of firm capital structure to firm value that maintains that by
decreasing debt in the capital structure, equity will be less risky (and hence less costly), in the absence of
market frictions. Id. at 17-18. There is, however, reason to believe that frictions in the banking context
limit the applicability of MM and that the cost of issuing significantly more equity would be expensive.
These frictions include most importantly a liquidity premium that investors pay for the unique
characteristic of banks' short-term liabilities, "information acquisition insensitivity" (i.e., investors can
trade the security with no need to ask questions nor incentive to produce private information about its
value), see, for example, Tri Vi Dang, Gary Gorton & Bengt Holmstrom, Ignorance, Debt and Financial
Crises (Feb. 13, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://faculty.som.yale.edu/
garygorton/workingpapers.html, in addition to information asymmetries, agency costs and the tax
subsidy of debt, which Calomiris and Herring emphasize for favoring CoCos. CALOMIRIS & HERRING,
supra note 90, at 8-9. And there can be a significant cost to the real economy when banks' cost of capital
increases, as banks can respond by curtailing lending, rather than increasing their equity capital. See,
e.g., Id. at 8 (providing sources documenting contractionary impact on lending of equity capital shocks);
MACROECONOMIC ASSESSMENT GRP. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, FINAL REPORT: ASSESSING THE
MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE TRANSITION TO STRONGER CAPITAL AND LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS
3-5 (2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/othpl2.pdf (estimating impact on lending and GDP of Basel III
increased capital requirements). These data should not be interpreted to mean that bank equity levels
should not be increased. Rather, they indicate that there is a cost-benefit tradeoff in adopting such a
policy, which provides impetus to consideration of the use of CoCos as an alternative.
96. Credit Suisse Goes CoCo to Placate Critics, SWISSINFO.CH (July 18, 2012),
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/CreditSuisse goesCoCo to placatecritics.html?cid=3313099
4. The Swiss banking authority's higher minimum capital requirement was immediately imposed, and of
the 19%, 10% must be common stock while the remainder can be financed by CoCos. Swiss Banks Set
to Issue CoCo Bonds in Large Size, CREDITFLUX (Oct. 4, 2010),
http://www.creditflux.com/Investing/2010-10-04/Swiss-banks-set-to-issue-coco-bonds-in-large-size/.
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equity to avoid triggering conversion (or to engage in sufficiently conservative
business strategies or prudential risk management so as not to come close to the
realm in which the CoCos would be triggered). Upon such action, the bank
would be positioned with a sufficiently high level of capital so that it would
remain at a considerable distance from the insolvency zone in which the moral
hazard or agency cost of debt problem can induce excessive risk-taking. In this
scenario, use of the contingent debt instrument would achieve the same
objective as mandating higher capital levels from the outset. The characteristics
of CoCos that would be appropriate for this purpose have been elaborated by
Charles Calomiris and Richard Herring: a large CoCo issue, a credible trigger
that is based on observable market prices at a high ratio of equity to assets (so
that the trigger would occur long before the bank is near insolvency), and a
conversion ratio sufficiently dilutive of the common stock that it makes the
dilution from issuing equity instead of undergoing the debt's conversion a more
desirable course of action by management.97 Getting the conversion dilution
factor correct is critical because it avoids what has been called the "Fuld" or
"Lehman Brothers" problem, which the Restricted Equity proposal could
magnify: the problem that a CEO with a sizeable stockholding will not want to
issue common stock, which would put a potentially distressed bank on a sound
footing, because the issuance would dilute his interest (that is, devalue the
shares).98 Such a CEO might not take prompt action until it was too late to issue
any equity, for instance, so that the action then resorted to might be the type of
high-risk gamble that is induced by limited liability in the insolvency zone.
Figure 2 provides a stylized depiction of a large bank's capital structure
under the three scenarios we have discussed: existing capital requirements, and
the two alternative capital structure reforms to couple with the Restricted
Equity proposal, a substantially higher leverage ratio, and a sizeable CoCo
mandate. As depicted in the figure, a properly designed CoCo, in conjunction
with a solid equity base, can replicate the capital structure attained by a higher
capital requirement. 99 This suggests the Restricted Equity proposal could also
97. CALOMIRIS & HERRING, supra note 90, at 12. They recommend an issue size
proportional to the bank's equity, and a market-based trigger based on a 90-day moving average of the
ratio of the market value of equity to the sum of the market value of equity plus the face value of debt,
and a conversion dilution of 5% of the market value of the stock relative to face value. In addition to
selling stock to avoid conversion, a bank could also sell assets to maintain the requisite equity to asset
ratio.
98. This problem, referred to as the problem of "debt overhang" preventing equity
issuance, is actually long-recognized in the finance literature. It was first identified by Stewart Myers in
his 1984 article, The Capital Structure Puzzle. Stewart C. Myers, The Capital Structure Puzzle, 39 J.
FIN. 575 (1984).
99. We would still increase the equity capital requirement to be greater than the
Basel requirements in the CoCo alternative; it just would not need to be as high because of either the
availability of the CoCos to convert into equity should the adverse state occur or the fact that
management will preemptively issue equity building up the capital ratio sufficiently high to avoid
triggering conversion. Calomiris and Herring suggest a 10% capital requirement in conjunction with a




be tied to a CoCo requirement to preserve its desirable incentive effect on bank
risk-taking.
Of course, the efficacy of CoCos depends crucially on the proper
structuring of the CoCos and initial capital levels. This includes the size of the
CoCo issue, the definition of the conversion trigger, the conversion rate, and
operational details such as whether all CoCos must be converted upon a
triggering event, and whether upon conversion, new CoCos must be issued.
Indeed, as proponents of CoCos are well aware, any one of many possible
design flaws could undermine the effectiveness of the instrument, particularly a
poorly calibrated trigger (such as an accounting-based trigger which might not
capture the true financial condition of the bank or a stock market trigger that
could be attacked by short sellers creating a "death spiral" of a declining price).
The most sophisticated proposals are structured to avoid the most obvious
pitfalls in trigger selection.100
It is, we think, therefore fair to say that formulating an effective CoCo
requirement will be challenging for a regulator to get just right, and the
diversity of proposals in the literature, none of which have been replicated in
the instruments that have actually been issued, only add to regulatory
perplexity, as they make clear that there is considerable disagreement over
optimal design. 01 In this regard, the requirement of a higher capital
requirement is a much simpler regulatory solution to the capital structure
reform issue presented by the limitation on the Restricted Equity proposal when
a bank nears insolvency. There are simply fewer moving parts that a regulator
must evaluate. We therefore tend to prefer that approach, although we are not
averse to experimentation across nations on any of these dimensions.
C. Introducing Diversity and Experimentation into Financial Regulation
The Basel accord that is the cornerstone of international financial
regulation is premised upon harmonizing capital and supervisory regulations
worldwide. As we have noted, the ideal capital requirements, or CoCo
configurations, are not matters readily ascertainable. Yet when all nations are
prompted to adopt identical regulations, there is no room for learning what
regulations among the plausible might work better. Moreover, the dynamic
environment in which financial institutions operate can quickly render
regulations inapt (as firms adapt and innovate to get around requirements and
minimize capital costs while new interactions or risks arise that regulations did
100. See e.g., Robert L. McDonald, Contingent Capital with a Dual Price Trigger
(February 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract-1553430 (discussing tradeoffs
involved in any CoCo design and advocating a specific market-based trigger as presenting best tradeoff
of advantages and problems with CoCos); DUFFIE, supra note 80, at 48-50 (noting problems with
accounting- and simple market-based triggers, and suggesting alternative market-based triggers of a
trailing average of stock prices or credit default swap prices to avoid them).
101. As we maintain in Section IV.C, use of national regulatory experimentation
would assist in determining an effective CoCo design, as well as an optimal capital ratio.
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not anticipate), yet the accord's revision process is cumbersome and incapable
of nimble responses. Negotiations over changes to the accord tend to be intense
and extended, as nations vie for provisions that will advantage, or at least not
disadvantage, domestic financial institutions, and that are consistent with
national policies. And when, due to exigency, as in the recent financial crisis,
the negotiation proceeds more rapidly, it is undercut by being offset with an
extremely long transition period.
We therefore believe that there is a need to introduce regulatory diversity
and experimentation into international financial regulation, to generate
information about what regulatory approaches are most cost-effective in
maintaining banks' equity positions. This can be done within the Basel
architecture, by establishing a peer review process in which nations would
receive approval to deviate from Basel requirements. The standard for approval
would be a determination by the review committee that the proposed deviation
would not significantly increase global systemic risk. To ensure further that a
departure would not adversely affect global systemic risk, approved departures
would be subject to both ongoing monitoring and a periodic review post-
approval process to evaluate the impact of its implementation on global
systemic risk.102
It is true that some nations have imposed more stringent requirements than
those adopted in Basel III. But we do not think this action is sufficient to
obviate the need for a formal process permitting deviations. Although the Basel
requirements are stated as minimums, so the present actions will not be
sanctioned by the Basel Committee, 03 it must be noted that it has historically
been rare for nations to deviate from Basel requirements and in the European
Union ("EU") there has been disagreement over whether a member-state should
be permitted to deviate from the EU's implementation of Basel standards at
all.10 More important, Basel does not permit experimentation in the form of its
102. For a comprehensive analysis of the construction and implementation of a
diversity mechanism within the Basel regulatory architecture, see Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the
International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture,
31 YALE. J. REG. 1 (2014). The requisite impact analysis is certainly feasible: economic analyses, using
a variety of methodologies, are routinely undertaken by bank regulators to assess the impact of
regulatory changes, such as, increasing capital requirements, on financial system stability as well as on
the real economy. Although even the best of methodologies is imperfect, they are sufficient for the task,
and the post-approval review and monitoring will both generate additional information to improve the
impact analysis and provide a safety valve to exit the experiment if, contrary to analytical predictions, it
turns out badly.
103. See Id. at 72-73, nn. 121-123. The identity of the deviators no doubt also
matters: when it is a critical player in global financial regulation that has influence on the Basel
Committee's decisions, (such as, the United States), it is not probable that the Committee would object
to the action.
104. The United Kingdom objected to the EU's proposed implementation of Basel
III, which would not even permit member states to deviate by increasing capital requirements. E.g.,
Nikki Tait, EU Leads Pack on Bank Capital, FIN. TIMES, July 20, 2011,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3fb41c06-b2el-Il e0-86b8-00144feabdcO.html#axzz3AW3T6ktn. The
final rule permitted member states to impose stricter requirements for two years, extendable upon the




capital requirements, which would allow the abandoning of risk-weighted
capital for alternative regimes, such as a leverage ratio bolstered with a
subordinated debt or CoCo regime.'os In our view, adopting a mechanism to
introduce diversity into international financial regulation will facilitate nations'
experimentation with capital levels, and other regulatory instruments, the
comparative effects of which should provide valuable information to regulators
concerning which approaches work best.
V. Conclusion
In the wake of the global financial crisis, attention has often focused on
whether incentives generated by bank executives' compensation programs led
to excessive risk-taking. Post-crisis compensation reform proposals have taken
broadly three approaches: long-term deferred equity incentive compensation,
mandatory bonus clawbacks upon accounting restatements and financial losses,
and debt-based compensation. We contend that bank executives', significant
employees', and directors' incentive compensation should consist only of
restricted stock and restricted stock options-restricted in the sense that the
individual cannot sell the shares or exercise the options for two to four years
after his or her last day in office. In our judgment, such an incentive
compensation package will focus bank managers' attention on the long-run and
discourage them from investing in high-risk but value-destroying projects.
As banks' equity values approach zero, equity based incentive programs
such as our Restricted Equity proposal, may lose their effectiveness in
restricting managers from taking on excessive risk and acting to maximize
shareholders' long-term value. Hence, for equity-based incentive structures to
be effective, banks should be financed with considerably more equity than they
are currently financed, so as to reduce the probability that a bank's equity value
approaches zero, although we do not have a precise number to recommend. We
advocate two alternatives to achieve this objective, requiring either
substantially higher leverage ratios (the percentage of equity to total assets) or
issuance of a sizeable level of contingent convertible debt or CoCos (debt that
converts to equity under specified circumstances). We further recommend
introducing regulatory diversity and experimentation into the international
financial architecture, as a mechanism to generate information concerning the
most efficacious design of bank capital structure reforms, and thereby improve
the quality of regulatory decision-making.
nation's proposal of stricter measures. Press Release, Council of the European Union, Council Adopts
New Bank Capital Requirements (June 20, 2013), www.consilium.europa.eu/.
105. For an example of such a proposal being advanced as preferable to adoption of
the then newly-proposed Basel II regime of internal-ratings based risk-weighted capital requirements,
see Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, Statement No. 160: Reforming Bank Capital Regulation,
AELORG (March 2, 2000), http://www.aei.org/article/economics/financial-services/reforming-bank-
capital-regulation-article.
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Figure 1: Ratio of Bank CEOs' Net Trades-to-Beginning Holdings 2000-08.
This figure, derived from data in Sanjai Bhagat and Brian Bolton, Financial Crises
and Bank Executive Incentive Compensation, 25 J. Corp. Fin. 313 (2014) , shows
the histogram distribution of the percentage of firm years, over the time period
2000-08, within two samples of bank CEOs, those of 14 firms that received TARP
funds ("TARP") and those of 37 banks which were not TARP recipients ("No-
TARP"), when the ratio of the CEOs' net trades, calculated as all open market sales
of stock less open market purchases and cost of exercising options, to the CEO's
stock holdings, including beneficial ownership and vested stock and exercisable
options, at the beginning of the year, exceeded 5%, 10% or 15%.
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Figure 2: Balance Sheet of a Large Bank
This figure presents stylized depictions of a large bank's capital structure under
three scenarios: existing capital regulations and the two alternative capital structure
reforms discussed in the text to couple with the Restricted Equity incentive
compensation proposal: higher bank capital requirements and contingent
convertible debt securities issuance.
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